ZBS issued summons in the magistrates court against Tinarwo claiming payment of $891,351 owed in terms of a mortgage bond. On 19 September 2001, ZBS obtained default judgment and a writ of execution was issued. On 12 November 2001, acting on Hove's instructions, the messenger of court removed Tinarwo's goods in execution. On 6 December 2001, an ex parte application for rescission of judgment and stay of execution filed by Tinarwo was served on Hove and HLA. A rule nisi was issued on 5 December, returnable on 18 December, directing the messenger of court to stay execution and ordering the applicant's legal practitioners to serve the order on the respondents. However, the rule nisi was not served on the messenger of court. The attached goods were sold by public auction on 11 December. The parties became aware of the sale on 21 December. On the return day, the rule nisi was confirmed by consent and it was ordered that the goods be released, but this was impossible as they had already been sold. Tinarwo then sued the defendants for $650,000, claiming the sale was due to their negligence in failing to notify the messenger of court of the stay of execution.
The plaintiff's claim was dismissed with costs.
A legal practitioner's paramount duty is to their client. While a legal practitioner may owe a duty of care to an identified third party when carrying out instructions that will affect that third party, such duty does not extend to situations where: (1) the third party has their own legal representation; (2) the third party's legal practitioners have initiated proceedings and have been specifically ordered to serve the relevant parties; and (3) the third party's legal practitioners have failed to comply with that order. Where a court order specifically imposes a duty on one party's legal practitioners to serve papers on a particular respondent, there is no concurrent duty on the opposing party's legal practitioners to perform that same act. A messenger of court is an officer of the court performing specific statutory duties and is not an agent of the execution creditor or the creditor's legal practitioner.
The court observed that Tinarwo's ex parte application contained numerous basic flaws, including confusion in the designation of parties (describing them as plaintiff/defendant rather than applicant/respondent, and inconsistency between headings and the body of affidavits). The court noted that ZBS had since noted an appeal against the consent order for the return of goods, claiming the magistrate had misdirected herself. While not necessary for the decision, the court's discussion of the general principles of delictual liability from cases like Halliwell v Johannesburg Municipality and Cape Town Municipality v Paine reinforced the established test for negligence based on the reasonable foreseeability of harm and the diligens paterfamilias standard.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law for clarifying the limits of a legal practitioner's duty of care to third parties, particularly execution debtors. It distinguishes situations where a legal practitioner owes such a duty (as in Maketo v Wood where payments were received) from situations where the third party's own legal representatives bear the responsibility for protecting their client's interests. The case also clarifies that a messenger of court is an officer of the court and not an agent of the execution creditor or their legal practitioner. It emphasizes the importance of proper pleading and service in civil procedure, particularly in applications for stay of execution.