The applicant was a former employee of the first respondent who had been provided with a company vehicle during his employment. Following termination of employment, the first respondent demanded return of the vehicle through correspondence between legal practitioners from September 2015 to February 2016, threatening civil action for recovery of the vehicle and damages. The applicant's lawyers advised in September 2015 that the vehicle would be delivered within 2 days, but this did not occur. In February 2016, summons were issued and served on the applicant claiming return of the vehicle and damages totaling $18,644.00. The applicant did not enter appearance to defend, and default judgment was granted. On 16 September 2016, the applicant was served with a notice of attachment and removal for execution scheduled for 18 September 2016. The applicant then filed both an urgent chamber application for stay of execution and an application for rescission of judgment on 17 August 2016 (though the judgment states service was in September). The applicant claimed he had engaged with the first respondent's managing director after service of summons and was assured that returning the vehicle would end the matter, which is why he did not defend. The first respondent vehemently denied any such engagement or assurance.
The matter was removed from the roll of urgent matters with costs awarded to the respondent.
A matter cannot be considered urgent where the applicant has failed to act when the need to act first arose, and the urgency stems from the applicant's own deliberate or careless abstention from action. The need to act in response to legal proceedings arises when summons is served, not when execution processes are subsequently initiated. An applicant seeking urgency must provide credible evidence that they treated the matter as urgent from the time the need to act arose and must provide a sensible, rational and realistic explanation for any delay. Urgency that is self-created through an applicant's own inaction will not be recognized by the court.
The court observed that the well-established principles on urgent applications from Kuvarega v Registrar General are now so notorious that even recently qualified legal practitioners should be expected to be familiar with them. The court also noted that where there are material disputes of fact in urgent applications, the court must determine which version is more probable based on the evidence and consistency with the documentary record. The court commented that an applicant's failure to join issue by filing a replying affidavit when their version is denied on oath weakens their case considerably.
This case reinforces the strict approach Zimbabwean courts take to urgent applications, particularly emphasizing that: (1) applicants must demonstrate they acted diligently when the need to act arose; (2) urgency is determined by objective assessment of when the need to act arose, not when the applicant chooses to act; (3) self-created urgency through delay or inaction will not be indulged; (4) an applicant's conduct after filing must be consistent with treating the matter as urgent; and (5) the law protects the diligent, not the sluggard. The case also illustrates the principle from Santam Insurance Ltd v Paget that stays of execution are not easily granted where judgment sounds in money, as prejudice is not usually irreparable.