The applicant was convicted of rape under s 65 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] following a full trial in the Regional Court sitting at Harare on 30 November 2017. He was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment with 2 years suspended for 5 years on conditions of good behavior. On 15 August 2019, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence out of time under CON 231/19. The respondent conceded to the application. On 19 September 2019, Chikowero J granted the application for condonation and extension of time to note an appeal. On 8 October 2019, when the clerk of court refused to accept the notice of appeal on the basis that the applicant had not obtained leave to prosecute in person, Chikowero J granted such leave. However, it later emerged that Manzunzu J had previously dismissed an earlier application for condonation for late noting of appeal under CON 94/19 on 27 May 2019. On 31 December 2019, Chitapi J in a bail pending appeal application (HH 120/20) set aside Chikowero J's orders on the basis that they were granted in error as the High Court's jurisdiction had already been exercised and exhausted by Manzunzu J. On 11 June 2022, the applicant requested written reasons for Chikowero J's orders of 19 September 2019 and 8 October 2019.
Chikowero J declined to provide detailed written reasons for the orders granted on 19 September 2019 and 8 October 2019, accepting that those orders had been granted in error and had already been set aside by Chitapi J on 31 December 2019.
Where a court of competent jurisdiction has already determined an application for condonation on the merits, a subsequent application for condonation on the same issue to another judge of coordinate jurisdiction is improperly brought, and any order granted on such subsequent application is granted in error as the court's jurisdiction has been fully exercised and exhausted by the earlier determination. Once it is established that an order was granted in error, it is not appropriate for the court to provide detailed written reasons for such order as doing so would be academic and would sanction an abuse of court process. The proper course is to acknowledge the error and accept that the order should not have been granted in the first place.
Chikowero J observed that had he been made aware at the time of the earlier determination by Manzunzu J, he would have struck the application off the roll of chamber applications rather than entertaining it on the merits. This highlights the importance of parties and their legal representatives making full disclosure to the court of all material facts, including prior applications and judicial determinations on related matters. The judge's comments implicitly criticize the failure to bring the prior application and its determination to his attention, which led to the erroneous grant of the orders.
This case is significant in South African and Zimbabwean jurisprudence (noting this is a Zimbabwean case with similar legal principles) as it illustrates important principles of court procedure, including: (1) the doctrine of exhaustion of jurisdiction - once a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a matter on the merits, the same court cannot entertain a fresh application on the same issue; (2) the principle that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not interfere with or reverse decisions of their colleagues except through the proper appellate process; (3) the proper approach when it becomes apparent that orders were granted in error; and (4) the principle that providing detailed reasons for orders granted in error would be academic and could amount to sanctioning an abuse of court process. The case reinforces the importance of full disclosure to the court of all material facts, including prior applications and determinations.