A split occurred in the Apostolic Faith Mission of Africa church resulting in two factions: one led by the applicant (Elliot Ncube) and the late Tony Tshuma, and another led by the first respondent and others constituting themselves as trustees. The applicant's faction controlled most church property. Previous litigation included: (1) HC 1735/14 where Tshuma obtained an interdict against the first respondent from acting as President; (2) HC 2700/14 where a defective application was filed (founding affidavit deposed to by Nyathi who was not cited as a party), resulting in default judgment on 11 June 2015 by Moyo J interdicting Ncube and Tshuma from church properties; (3) An appeal noted to Supreme Court (SC 351/15) on 25 June 2015; (4) HC 1669/15 where Makonese J granted leave to execute pending appeal on 9 July 2015; (5) Another appeal noted (SC 389/15); (6) Two unsuccessful applications in Supreme Court (SC 450/15 and SC 475/15) to strike down appeals; (7) Appeals postponed on 25 July 2016 due to Tshuma's death. On 3 August 2016, respondents moved to execute the HC 2700/14 order, prompting this urgent application for stay of execution.
The provisional order for stay of execution was granted in terms of the draft order. Execution of the judgments in HC 2700/14 and HC 1669/15 was stayed pending determination of the Supreme Court appeals in SC 351/15 and SC 389/15.
The High Court has discretion to stay execution of its own orders pending appeal where real and substantial justice requires such a stay or where injustice would otherwise result, even where the order sought to be executed is a default judgment. This discretion is exercised to regulate the court's process. Relevant considerations include: (1) whether the appeal court has previously assessed and declined to strike down the appeals; (2) apparent irregularities in the proceedings leading to the judgment; (3) the conduct of parties (including delay in seeking execution); (4) whether allowing execution would cause irreversible harm or confusion; (5) the balance of justice between the parties. An appeal may be noted against a default judgment, and the existence of such an appeal is a factor to consider when deciding whether to stay execution.
The court made several obiter observations: (1) It is doubtful whether a party not cited in a court process could be added in the course of proceedings (citing Gariya Safaris (Pvt) Ltd v Van Wyk and other authorities); (2) When parties approach court on an urgent basis, there is danger of insufficient time to place all useful evidence before the court, which is why the rules provide for interim rather than final relief in urgent applications; (3) Section 44 of the Administration of Estates Act prohibits suing out of writs of execution after death of a judgment debtor but does not affect process already sued out before death; (4) A court that grants an order beyond what was sought in the relief claimed may be functus officio; (5) The judge noted he had no jurisdiction to examine or review orders made by fellow High Court judges, nor to determine the merits of pending Supreme Court appeals - his role was limited to exercising discretion on stay of execution.
This case clarifies important principles regarding the High Court's discretion to stay execution pending appeal. It demonstrates that: (1) appeals can be noted against default judgments; (2) Zesa Staff Pension Fund v Mushambadzi supports, rather than negates, the court's discretion to stay execution; (3) the court has inherent power to regulate its own process to prevent injustice; (4) when exercising discretion to stay execution, relevant factors include the validity of underlying orders, actions of the Supreme Court regarding the appeals, potential for irreversible harm, and the interests of justice; (5) apparent procedural irregularities in obtaining default judgment are relevant considerations. The case is significant in church property disputes and illustrates judicial management of complex multi-party litigation involving competing factions.