The respondent offered to sell "the remaining extent of sub-division A of Wilfred's Hope Farm" held under title deed 2499/92. The property was described in identical terms in: (1) the mandate to the estate agent, (2) the estate agent's letter to the Ministry of Lands dated 11 November 1997, and (3) the Deed of Sale signed on 31 October 1997. The respondent received the full purchase price. The Agreement of Sale contained a clause stating it constituted the entire contract between the parties. After receiving full payment, on 8 April 2000, the respondent wrote to Coghlan & Welsh instructing them to release the Title Deeds, acknowledging the applicant had acquired ownership. Subsequently, the respondent claimed he only intended to sell the eastern portion of the property (without improvements), not the whole property, and resisted transfer.
1. An order evicting the defendant and all persons and livestock taking under him from the whole of Remaining Extent of Subdivision A of Wilfred's Hope Farm situate in the Bulilimamangwe District was granted. 2. Respondent was ordered to pay the costs of suit.
Where a written agreement of sale clearly describes the property being sold, is supported by consistent documentation from all parties (including mandates and correspondence), contains an entire agreement clause, and the seller has acknowledged transfer of ownership and received full payment, the seller cannot resist transfer by alleging a contrary undocumented intention to sell only a portion of the property. Such a defence is spurious and does not constitute a bona fide defence warranting refusal of summary judgment. Furthermore, it is unlawful to purport to sell a portion of property that has not yet been created through an approved subdivision application.
The court observed that legal practitioners and estate agents would not have allowed the respondent to enter into an agreement to sell what was still to be created out of a subdivision not yet applied for and approved, indicating the professional duties of legal practitioners and estate agents to ensure lawful transactions. The judge's characterization of the defence as "not only spurious but also dishonest" suggests a strong disapproval of attempts to avoid contractual obligations through fabricated defences.
This case is significant as it demonstrates the Zimbabwean courts' approach to summary judgment applications where a defendant raises a defence contradicted by documentary evidence and their own prior conduct. It reinforces the principle that courts will grant summary judgment where a defence is spurious and dishonest, rather than bona fide. The case also illustrates the application of the parol evidence rule through entire agreement clauses, and emphasizes that parties cannot unilaterally resile from clear written agreements by claiming undocumented contrary intentions. It confirms that property sales must be based on legally defined portions and cannot relate to subdivisions not yet created or approved.