Elizabeth Mapurisa and Others v Nehanda Housing Cooperative and Another

The first applicant was suspended by the first respondent (Nehanda Housing Cooperative) on 9 September 2014. On 27 September 2014, a general meeting of the first respondent elected a new Management Committee which the first applicant disputed. The first applicant filed a main application under HC 9842/14 on 6 November 2014 in terms of s 85(1)(c) of the Constitution challenging the legitimacy of the new Management Committee and the general meeting that elected it. On 8 March 2015, the applicants allegedly learnt of a transaction between the first and second respondents concerning disposal of certain land in which they had an interest. On 9 March 2015, the applicants were notified of their eviction from the cooperative's houses. On 10 March 2015, the applicants filed an urgent application seeking to interdict the first respondent from selling stands, disposing of assets, and preventing the second respondent from interfering with the first respondent's administration.

• Whether the applicants demonstrated sufficient urgency to have the matter heard on an urgent basis
• Whether the applicants' delay from September 2014 to March 2015 negated the urgency claimed
• Whether the applicants had created self-induced urgency
• Whether the first applicant had demonstrated a mandate to act on behalf of other members of the cooperative as required by s 85(1)(c) of the Constitution
• Whether it was appropriate to grant urgent relief dependent on the outcome of a pending main application

The court declined to hear the matter on an urgent basis. The applicants were ordered to pay costs of the application for both the first and second respondents.

An urgent application will be refused where: (1) applicants have delayed unreasonably from the time they became aware of the circumstances giving rise to the relief sought, thereby creating self-induced urgency; (2) the urgent relief sought is dependent on the conclusion of a pending main action, as this would require the court to speculate on the outcome of matters not yet determined; and (3) a party claiming to act on behalf of others under s 85(1)(c) of the Constitution fails to provide tangible evidence (such as affidavits of collegiality) demonstrating a mandate to represent such persons - a bare assertion is insufficient.

The court observed that the eviction process initiated against the applicants could be dealt with independently according to prescribed court rules, separate from the main application challenging the Management Committee's legitimacy. The court also noted, somewhat critically, that in the main application HC 9842/14, the first applicant did not even seek to have the decisions of the Management Committee set aside, despite challenging their legitimacy - suggesting an inconsistency in the applicant's approach to the relief sought.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for establishing strict requirements for urgent applications, particularly emphasizing that: (1) litigants cannot benefit from self-created urgency arising from their own delay; (2) urgent relief should not be sought where it depends on the outcome of a pending main action, as this forces speculation by the court; (3) parties claiming to represent a class of persons under s 85(1)(c) of the Constitution must provide tangible evidence of their mandate, not merely bare assertions; and (4) awareness of events triggering potential prejudice starts the clock for determining urgency, not subsequent related events. The judgment reinforces principles against abuse of urgent application procedures.