On 1 December 2010, a consent order was granted placing David Whitehead Textiles Limited and related companies under provisional judicial management, with Winsley Militala (Mr Militala) appointed as provisional judicial manager. The order required Mr Militala to provide security for US$12,000,000 in terms of section 302 of the Companies Act. Mr Militala obtained a bond from Allied Insurance Company, but the insurer subsequently withdrew the bond after discovering it lacked capacity to cover the full risk, leaving Mr Militala without any security. Elgate Investments (first applicant), a creditor, filed an urgent application on 2 February 2011 seeking to revoke Mr Militala's appointment, alleging: (1) failure to provide security; (2) allowing a disputed claim of US$3,000,000 while the matter was still before the court; (3) signing a lease agreement with Kithra for no rental except a US$15,000 management fee payable to himself; and (4) a break-in at the industrial property resulting in loss. Several creditors applied to be joined to the proceedings as applicants or respondents.
The application was dismissed with costs.
Companies under provisional judicial management retain their legal identity and ownership interests, and must be cited as parties in applications seeking to vary the provisional judicial management order. An application to vary a provisional judicial management order must be brought in terms of section 301(2) of the Companies Act, must cite all parties to the original order, and where the original order contains directions staying proceedings without leave of court, such leave must be obtained before proceeding. Failure to comply with these requirements constitutes a fatal irregularity that renders the application not properly before the court. Rule 87 of the High Court Rules cannot be invoked to cure such fundamental procedural defects where there is no leave of court to proceed and necessary parties have not been cited.
The court made observations regarding the conduct of legal practitioners, emphasizing that legal practitioners must retain their independence in relation to clients and litigation, and function as officers of the court rather than merely seeking to win cases at any cost. The court also distinguished judicial management from liquidation, noting that liquidation aims to wind up and dissolve a company, while judicial management aims to avoid liquidation by allowing the company to overcome difficulties through proper management under court supervision. The court noted the fundamental differences between the functions and powers of liquidators versus judicial managers, and between the rights of creditors in liquidation versus judicial management.
This case establishes important principles regarding judicial management proceedings in Zimbabwe: (1) companies under judicial management retain their legal identity, ownership and shareholding, and must be cited as parties in applications affecting their management; (2) judicial management transfers management control, not ownership, with the purpose of rehabilitating rather than dissolving the company; (3) applications to vary provisional judicial management orders must comply with section 301(2) of the Companies Act and cite all parties to the original order; (4) where a provisional order contains directions staying proceedings without leave of court, such leave must be obtained before bringing applications affecting the judicially managed companies; and (5) procedural irregularities in judicial management proceedings will not be cured by invoking Rule 87 where fundamental requirements such as obtaining leave and citing necessary parties have not been met. The judgment emphasizes strict adherence to proper procedure in the specialized area of judicial management.