Elder Sam Hushai v Alpha Media Holdings and Others

The plaintiff (Elder Sam Hushai), acting in person, issued summons against the defendants on 28 December 2010, claiming damages for defamation in the sum of US$1,800,000.00. The allegedly defamatory article was published on 16 December 2010 in NewsDay. The defendants filed their notice of appearance to defend, and subsequently filed a notice of exception on 16 February 2011. The plaintiff's declaration contained rambling paragraphs referring to a criminal trial, and critically failed to set out the allegedly defamatory words complained of. The plaintiff was referred to as "Elder Sam Mushonga" in the offending article, but the declaration did not establish how readers would associate "Mushonga" with the plaintiff "Hushai".

• Whether the summons and declaration complied with Order 3 Rule 11 of the High Court Rules
• Whether the declaration was vague, argumentative and embarrassing in contravention of Order 15 of the High Court Rules
• Whether the declaration disclosed a cause of action where the allegedly defamatory words were not set out
• Whether a failure to plead the offending words in a defamation action is fatal to the claim

The summons and declaration were struck down with costs in favor of the defendants.

In a defamation action, the allegedly defamatory words must be specifically pleaded in the declaration. A failure to plead that upon which the cause of action is founded is fatal and discloses no cause of action at all. While self-actors are permitted some leeway in the application of court rules, this does not extend to fundamental pleading requirements that are essential to enable the defendant to properly respond to the claim.

The court observed that it was prepared to condone the contents of paragraphs 3.2 to 3.6 of the declaration (which were argumentative, vague and rambling) on the basis that the plaintiff was a self-actor. The court also noted that the plaintiff needed to "put his house in order" regarding compliance with the rules, suggesting that if the defects were cured, a fresh action might be properly constituted.

This case reinforces the fundamental principle in defamation actions that the allegedly defamatory words must be specifically pleaded in the declaration. Even where a plaintiff is a self-actor entitled to some leeway in the application of procedural rules, the failure to plead the essential elements of the cause of action (in this case, the defamatory words themselves) is fatal. The case demonstrates the limits of the court's indulgence toward litigants in person and emphasizes that certain pleading requirements are indispensable to allow defendants to properly respond to claims.