Edward Tawanda Madza & Others v The Reformed Church in Zimbabwe Daisyfield Trust & Others

In 1984, the Dutch Reformed Church formed the Daisyfield Trust as a non-profit company to oversee schools under a Christian ethos. Eaglesvale School fell under this oversight. In 2010, the Dutch Reformed Church decided to hand over the Trust to the Reformed Church of Zimbabwe. On 15 March 2013, the Trust's name was changed to the Reformed Church in Zimbabwe's Daisyfield Trust. The first to eighth appellants were members of the Board of Governors managing Eaglesvale School, and the ninth and tenth appellants were members of the School Development Committees. On 12 July 2013, the Board of Trustees dissolved the School Management Board with immediate effect, citing non-compliance with instructions to reinstate the headmaster (third respondent) who had been suspended. An interim board was appointed. The appellants discovered on 15 August 2013 that approximately $80,000 had allegedly been misappropriated from school funds by the respondents between 19 June and 19 July 2013. On 21 August 2013, the appellants brought an urgent application seeking a provisional order declaring their management authority and interdicting the respondents from interfering with the school's administration and finances. The High Court dismissed the application on grounds of lack of urgency and lack of locus standi.

• Whether the matter was sufficiently urgent to warrant an urgent hearing
• Whether the appellants had locus standi to bring the application on behalf of the Board of Governors
• What is the proper order when a court finds a matter is not urgent
• Whether dismissal of an application on grounds of both lack of urgency and lack of locus standi is competent

1. The appeal succeeds in part. 2. The judgment of the court a quo is altered to read as follows: "The matter is not urgent. It is removed from the roll. The applicants shall pay the costs of this application." 3. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appeal.

When a court concludes that a matter is not urgent and should not be given priority on the urgent roll, the proper order is to refuse to hear the application and remove it from the roll, allowing the applicant the option of enrolling the matter on the ordinary roll. It is a contradiction in terms and a misdirection to dismiss a matter on the twin bases that it is not urgent and that the applicant lacks locus standi, because the latter involves a decision on the merits which bars the applicant from placing the matter on the ordinary roll and deprives them of their right to have the matter properly ventilated. Issues going to the merits, including locus standi involving disputes of fact, should not be finally determined when deciding whether to grant an urgent hearing, as this deprives parties of the opportunity to adduce further evidence.

The Court noted that it is always reluctant to decide matters at first and last instance, though it may do so in exceptional circumstances. This is because it is preferable to have the benefit of the reasoning of the lower court, and that way an appellant is not deprived of the right to appeal by placing before the Supreme Court a different view from that of the court a quo. The Court also observed that the insufficiency of evidence in a founding affidavit is not necessarily fatal to establishing locus standi, as that deficiency can in given circumstances be remedied by further evidence. The Court commented that the appellants were vague about when problems with the Trustees began and failed to provide sufficient detail about the dates of occurrences, which contributed to the finding that they had not established urgency.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean civil procedure for clarifying the proper approach when a court finds a matter is not urgent. It establishes that a court cannot simultaneously dismiss a matter for lack of urgency and decide issues on the merits (such as locus standi), as this contradicts the nature of the urgency determination and deprives litigants of their right to have matters heard on the ordinary roll. The judgment reinforces procedural fairness by ensuring that applicants whose matters are found not urgent are not put out of court entirely but retain the option to pursue their claims through ordinary procedures. It also clarifies that issues involving disputes of fact should not be finally determined at the urgent application stage where parties have not had full opportunity to adduce evidence.