The applicant was married to the first and second respondents' daughter, Jacaranda, and they were engaged in an acrimonious divorce. The third respondent is Jacaranda's sister, resident in the USA, who visits Zimbabwe annually. On 22 January 2002, Jacaranda left for the USA, having arranged for matrimonial property to be stored with various people including the first and second respondents. When the applicant discovered the property had been removed from the matrimonial home at Macheka Farm, he obtained court orders for access and managed to recover some property. He compiled a list of missing items, believing paintings and other property were stored with the respondents. On 28 February 2002, he instituted an action against Jacaranda and the three respondents claiming return of missing property. On 1 March 2002, he filed an ex parte application for arrest tamquam suspectus de fuga, believing the respondents intended to leave the country on 3 March 2002 with valuable paintings. A provisional order was granted on 2 March 2002, and the third respondent was arrested. The parties then agreed that respondents would surrender their passports to secure the third respondent's release.
1) The Provisional order issued on 2nd March 2002 is hereby discharged; 2) The applicant is ordered to release the respondents' passports forthwith; 3) Applicant is to pay costs of suit.
To obtain an arrest order tamquam suspectus de fuga, an applicant must establish a concrete factual basis showing that the respondent intends to flee the jurisdiction with the applicant's property. Mere belief, suspicion, or coincidental timing (such as arrival in the country on the same day another party departed) is insufficient to justify such an extraordinary remedy. Where events have overtaken the relief sought (such as the property in question being placed in the custody of legal practitioners), the basis for the arrest order falls away. A party must establish a nexus between a respondent and the alleged wrongful conduct before seeking relief against that respondent.
The court observed that the respondents were not candid with the court when they claimed to have pointed out paintings to the Deputy Sheriff who allegedly refused to remove them, noting it made no sense that a Deputy Sheriff would refuse to remove property he had specifically gone to collect. The court also noted that while the respondents sought costs de bonis propriis against the applicant's attorney (Mr Bull), this was not actively pursued and was half-heartedly argued, with submissions almost amounting to a concession that such an order was not appropriate. The court commented that any recourse regarding paintings disposed of by Jacaranda should be pursued against her in the divorce proceedings where Smith J had made findings about her disposal of property, rather than against the respondents in this application.
This case illustrates the requirements for obtaining arrest orders tamquam suspectus de fuga in Zimbabwean law, particularly in the context of matrimonial property disputes. It demonstrates that courts require concrete evidence, not mere suspicion or belief, that a party intends to flee the jurisdiction with property before granting such extraordinary relief. The case also emphasizes the importance of candor with the court and the consequences of bringing unfounded applications, particularly against parties with no apparent connection to the disputed conduct.