Edmos Gabarinocheka v Officer Commanding Traffic Central Business District, Bulawayo and Others

The applicant was a Sergeant in the Zimbabwe Republic Police with 26 years of service, stationed at the National Highway Patrol. On 17 September 2011, while conducting a roadblock in Bulawayo CBD with his team, he stopped an omnibus (registration ABQ 9523) with excess passengers. The driver paid a spot fine. The applicant allegedly discovered that the driver had photocopies of a Route Authority and Operator's Licence, became emotional, declared them invalid, and tore them in full view of the public. The vehicle documents belonged to Levy Sibanda, the Deputy Commissioner General of ZRP. Following investigations on 17-18 September 2011, the applicant and his entire team were summoned to Harare on 19 September 2011, interrogated, and with immediate effect transferred to different stations (applicant to Gwanda). On 3 October 2011, he was notified to attend a disciplinary hearing on 4 October 2011. He was charged under section 34 of the Schedule to the Police Act for "performing a duty in an improper manner". His legal practitioner requested referral to a magistrate's court, arguing lack of fair trial given the complainant was the Deputy Commissioner General, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias. The hearing was postponed to 13 October 2011. When respondents refused the referral, the applicant sought an interdict to stop the disciplinary hearing.

• Whether a police member charged before a single officer under section 29(1)(d) of the Police Act has the right to elect trial by a magistrate's court under section 32 of the Police Act
• Whether the applicant was entitled to an interdict stopping the disciplinary hearing pending determination of his right to elect trial by magistrate

Application dismissed with costs.

A police member charged before a single officer under section 29(1)(d) of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] for minor infractions does not have the right to elect trial by a magistrate's court under section 32 of the Act. Section 32 applies only to members facing trial before a board of officers under section 29(1)(c) for serious offences. The legislative distinction between serious offences (tried by board of officers with right to elect magistrate trial) and minor infractions (tried by single officer without such right) is deliberate and must be given effect. Minor infractions under section 29(1)(d) are internal disciplinary matters, not criminal offences, as evidenced by: the limited penalties (14 days imprisonment and level 2 fine), section 34(9)'s provision that such findings do not constitute criminal convictions, and automatic review by the Commissioner General.

While not directly addressed in the final determination, the court's judgment implicitly acknowledges the applicant's concerns about potential bias (given that the complainant was the Deputy Commissioner General and the presiding officer was his junior), but does not engage with these natural justice arguments. The court focused exclusively on the narrow statutory interpretation question. The judgment also notes without comment the applicant's summary transfer along with his entire team immediately following the incident, which might raise questions about procedural fairness in administrative action, but these issues were not determinative of the application.

This case clarifies the interpretation of section 32 of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] regarding the right to elect trial by magistrate's court in police disciplinary proceedings. It establishes that this right is limited to officers facing trial before a board of officers for serious offences, and does not extend to members facing minor disciplinary charges before a single officer. The judgment distinguishes between serious disciplinary matters (which carry criminal consequences) and minor internal disciplinary infractions. It reinforces the principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature's choice to limit certain procedural protections to specific categories of cases must be respected. The case is important for understanding the internal disciplinary framework of police forces and the limits of procedural rights in administrative/disciplinary proceedings as opposed to criminal trials.