The respondent (landlord) leased residential premises at No 707 Warwick House C, J Chinamano Avenue Harare to the appellant (tenant) on 1 March 2006 for twelve months at a monthly rent, with an option to renew for a further twelve months. The lease was terminable by either party on two calendar months' notice under Clause 28. On 4 December 2006, the respondent's estate agent gave the appellant notice to vacate by 28 February 2007, stating the lease would not be renewed and the lessor required the property for repossession. The appellant responded on 5 December 2006 through his legal practitioner, refusing to vacate and asserting he would remain as a statutory tenant. On 28 February 2007, the appellant purported to exercise the option to renew the lease. The respondent applied to the Northern Region Rent Board for a certificate of ejectment, stating he required the premises for residential occupation by himself and his wife. The appellant opposed, claiming the respondent had other properties and wanted to re-let at higher rent. The Rent Board granted the certificate of ejectment on 6 December 2007. The appellant appealed to the Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) When a lessor gives notice that a lease will not be renewed and terminates the lease in accordance with the contractual termination clause, the lessee cannot thereafter validly exercise an option to renew that was contained in the lease being terminated, particularly where the lessee has accepted the termination by declaring an intention to become a statutory tenant. (2) An appeal to the Administrative Court under section 37(1) of the Rent Regulations is an appeal on the record, and grounds of appeal relating to matters not raised before and determined by the Rent Board cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. (3) A Rent Board's exercise of discretion in assessing the credibility of parties and determining whether a requirement to vacate premises is "fair and reasonable" under section 30(2)(e) of the Rent Regulations will only be interfered with on appeal if shown to be objectively irrational. (4) For purposes of issuing a certificate under section 30(2)(e), the Rent Board need not act on the basis of a notice given strictly in terms of section 30(2)(c), provided there was a notice to vacate that placed the tenant in the position of a statutory tenant, followed by an application for a certificate of ejectment.
The Court observed that although the learned President of the Administrative Court considered grounds relating to alleged non-compliance with section 30(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Regulations and rejected them, he did not need to consider them as they related to matters not raised before the Rent Board. The Court noted that the Rent Board could not be accused of misdirecting itself on matters it was not asked to address. The Court also commented that it is reasonable for a couple whose children have grown and left home to want to move into smaller premises, and there was nothing unusual about this proposition. While these observations provided context, they were not essential to the decision, which turned primarily on the acceptance by the appellant that the lease had been terminated and the proper scope of appellate review.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean landlord and tenant law for clarifying several important principles: (1) the effect of a landlord's notice of non-renewal on a tenant's option to renew a lease; (2) the scope of appellate review in administrative appeals under the Rent Regulations, particularly that appeals to the Administrative Court are confined to matters on the record before the Rent Board; (3) the standard for reviewing a Rent Board's exercise of discretion in assessing credibility and determining whether a landlord's requirement for premises is "fair and reasonable" under section 30(2)(e) of the Rent Regulations; and (4) the distinction between different grounds for ejectment under section 30(2) and the procedural requirements for each. The case reinforces that appellate courts will not interfere with discretionary findings on credibility unless the assessment is shown to be objectively irrational.