Econet Wireless, a telecommunications services provider, brought an urgent application for an interdict against POTRAZ, the regulatory authority established under the Postal and Telecommunications Act [Cap 12:05]. On 16 October 2014, POTRAZ issued Regulatory Determination Number 1 of 2014, which fixed new National Interconnection tariffs and Mobile Voice tariffs for telecommunications operators for December 2014 to December 2016, reducing tariffs significantly. The applicant alleged that POTRAZ varied existing tariffs without affording it a hearing, violated principles of natural justice and the Constitution, acted ultra vires the Act, and discriminated against it as the only operator who had paid $137.5 million in licence fees. Extensive consultations had occurred between the parties since March 2014, with the applicant writing on 24 June 2014 challenging POTRAZ's authority to impose tariffs and threatening legal action within seven days. However, no action was taken until 24 October 2014, just before the 14 November 2014 implementation date.
The application was dismissed as not urgent. The applicant was ordered to pay costs on a legal practitioner-client scale (higher scale) as punishment for material non-disclosure and attempting to mislead the court.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Urgency in applications requires that the applicant act contemporaneously when the need to act arises, not merely when the deadline approaches - urgency which stems from deliberate or careless abstention from action until the deadline draws near is not the type contemplated by the rules; (2) A certificate of urgency must be based on a properly signed and commissioned founding affidavit, not on draft papers; (3) Both the certificate of urgency and the founding affidavit must adequately disclose and explain urgency, including any delays in bringing the application; (4) Material non-disclosure of relevant correspondence in urgent applications, particularly relating to urgency, warrants dismissal and punitive costs orders; (5) Legal practitioners certifying matters as urgent must apply their minds to properly attested affidavits and should not insist on seeing draft papers or act as rubber stamps.
The court made critical observations about professional conduct: (1) Legal practitioners who certify matters as urgent have no business insisting on seeing affidavits in draft form to ensure they disclose urgency - their role is to assess completed affidavits, not to help craft them; (2) This practice is "undoubtedly wrong," "most inappropriate" and "ought to be discouraged"; (3) The court expressed particular disappointment that senior counsel (Mr. Nyambirai, described as "a senior and well respected member of the profession") would engage in selective disclosure, stating "We expect better than that from him"; (4) The court noted it would have addressed the preliminary point about wrong procedure (that the matter should have proceeded as an appeal under s 96 of the Act rather than by interdict) and the merits of whether POTRAZ acted ultra vires, but declined to do so having found the matter not urgent; (5) The court observed that courts should discourage urgent applications characterized by material non-disclosures, mala fides or dishonesty, and may make adverse or punitive orders as a seal of disapproval.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and procedural law for several reasons: (1) It reinforces strict requirements for urgent applications, requiring applicants to act immediately when threats arise rather than waiting until implementation deadlines; (2) It establishes that certificates of urgency must be based on properly attested founding affidavits and cannot be issued on draft papers; (3) It emphasizes the duty of candor and full disclosure in urgent applications, particularly regarding prior correspondence and delays; (4) It criticizes the practice of legal practitioners certifying matters as urgent without proper application of mind or based on draft affidavits; (5) It confirms that courts will impose punitive costs orders (attorney-client scale) where applicants engage in material non-disclosure or attempt to mislead the court in urgent applications; and (6) It demonstrates judicial intolerance for self-created urgency arising from deliberate inaction.