The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company in Bulawayo from 1 June 1995. In December 1995, he failed to report for duty on 4th, 5th and 6th, claiming he was sitting for examinations. He was found guilty and given a final written warning. On 15 March 1996, he was transferred to Mutare but refused to go. He was suspended and subsequently dismissed on 31 May 1996 after a disciplinary hearing. The plaintiff instituted proceedings under HC 3222/98 for wrongful dismissal. In 2004, under SC2/04, the Supreme Court found violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under sections 18(9) and 18(10) of the Constitution and ordered the High Court to deal with compensation issues. In 2009, under HB 4/09, the High Court awarded the plaintiff $70,162,577,950.50 for wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff then filed fresh proceedings in 2011 claiming US$1,500,000.00 as damages for breach of his constitutional rights arising from the same facts. The defendant filed a special plea based on res judicata and prescription.
The defendant's special plea was upheld. The plaintiff's claims were dismissed with costs.
A single cause of action cannot support a plurality of claims. Where a litigant has already obtained judgment on a cause of action, including constitutional remedies and damages for wrongful dismissal, they cannot subsequently bring fresh proceedings claiming damages for constitutional violations arising from the same facts and circumstances. The matter becomes res judicata once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. A party cannot "take two bites at the same cherry" by splitting claims arising from the same homogeneous cause of action. Additionally, delictual claims for damages must be brought within the prescriptive period of three years from the date the claimant became aware of the breach, failing which the claims become prescribed and unenforceable.
The Court noted that the Supreme Court, when exercising powers under section 24(1) of the Constitution in constitutional applications, has very wide discretion as far as remedies are concerned. The Court also observed that the plaintiff had elected not to pursue certain aspects of the Supreme Court order (specifically the claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred due to postponements) when the matter was finalized at trial, and that this election was binding. The Court further commented that not only had the action prescribed, but the judgment had become superannuated, meaning the plaintiff could not seek enforcement and execution based upon it.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for establishing important principles regarding the relationship between constitutional remedies and common law claims arising from the same cause of action. It clarifies that a litigant cannot fragment a single cause of action into multiple claims and pursue them sequentially, particularly where the constitutional court has already provided comprehensive remedies including directions for compensation. The case reinforces the doctrine of res judicata in the context of constitutional litigation and emphasizes that parties must pursue all available remedies arising from a single cause of action together, or risk being barred from subsequent claims. It also confirms that prescription runs from the date of knowledge of the breach, even in constitutional matters, and that failure to pursue claims timeously will result in their extinction.