The appellant (Miloc) sought judgment for two money claims: (1) R9,985,455.10 allegedly owing on overdrawn bank accounts that Standard Bank had ceded to it, and (2) R3,141,337.87 allegedly advanced under a loan agreement dated 6 May 2004. The first respondent was the principal debtor, with other respondents standing as sureties. The parties had concluded settlement discussions in July 2005, agreeing that the appellant would receive R7 million in full settlement through three share sale agreements: (i) the Swanepoel-Sigma agreement for R1.5 million; (ii) the Moolman-Sigma agreement for R1.5 million; and (iii) the USA agreement for R4 million. The eleventh respondent paid R1 million on 3 September 2005 and R1 million on 2 December 2005. The Moolman-Sigma agreement provided that upon payment of R1.5 million, the Sigma shares would be released from pledge. The USA agreement provided that upon final payment of R4 million, all shares and securities would be released. The appellant refused to release the Sigma shares purchased under the Moolman-Sigma agreement unless the eleventh respondent provided additional guarantees for the USA agreement balance. The appellant then purported to cancel both agreements on 17 July 2006 and claimed the full original debt amounts.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Where neither debtor nor creditor appropriates a payment to a specific debt, the common law rules apply and the payment must be appropriated to the debt which is most onerous to the debtor or most in the debtor's interest to pay. The principle of reciprocity (exceptio non adimpleti contractus) can apply across multiple separate agreements if the terms of the agreements considered as a whole clearly evince the intention that there would be reciprocity between the obligations undertaken in each agreement. Where reciprocity applies, a party who is in mora in respect of its reciprocal obligation cannot demand performance of the counter-obligation or validly cancel the agreement for non-performance of that counter-obligation. The counter-party is entitled to withhold performance and their obligation is suspended until the party in mora performs.
The court noted without deciding that if the share sale agreements were validly cancelled, it was possible (but not decided) that the appellant could claim the full amounts allegedly owing under the old indebtedness rather than being limited to claiming the balance under the USA agreement. The court also commented that the question of whether a court a quo has the power to act mero motu in ordering a reference to trial has been described as 'not free from difficulty' and has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court observed that while it would not say a court of appeal should never order a reference to trial where not sought below or raised in appeal, such an order would only be appropriate, if at all, in special circumstances.
This case provides important authority on the application of common law rules for appropriation of payments where neither debtor nor creditor has made express appropriation. It reaffirms that payment is appropriated to the debt most onerous or most in the debtor's interest to discharge. The case also clarifies the application of the principle of reciprocity (exceptio non adimpleti contractus) in contracts. It confirms that reciprocity can apply across multiple separate agreements where the terms considered as a whole evince an intention of reciprocity between obligations. The case demonstrates that a creditor who is in mora regarding a reciprocal obligation cannot demand performance from the debtor or cancel the agreement for non-performance. It also addresses procedural issues regarding when courts may order a reference to trial, indicating that a court of appeal would only do so in special circumstances where it was not sought below or raised in the notice of appeal.