In September 1996, the Eastern Cape Provincial Tender Board invited tenders for the supply of a Bi-Plane Catheterisation Laboratory to the Provincial Hospital, Port Elizabeth. The closing time and date for submission of tenders was 11:00 on 10 October 1996. Philips submitted its tender timeously. Tecmed's tender document was collected by courier in Johannesburg on 9 October 1996 for express delivery to East London, but all flights were cancelled due to unforeseen industrial action by South African Airways employees. Tecmed's tender was consequently delivered after 11:00 on 10 October 1996, making it late. The Board's secretariat submitted all tenders to the Board, including Tecmed's, erroneously treating it as a facsimile tender and failing to inform the Board that it was late. The Board was never informed that Tecmed's tender was late and awarded the tender to Tecmed on 16 May 1997, with the order placed on 2 June 1997. Philips applied to the High Court, Bisho, on 28 August 1997 to review and set aside the Board's decision and to exclude Tecmed from the tender process. The High Court granted the order with costs. Tecmed appealed after obtaining leave from the Chief Justice.
The appeal against order (a) (setting aside the Board's decision to award the tender to Tecmed) was dismissed. The appeal against orders (b) and (c) (referring the matter back to the Board to consider tenders afresh and interdicting the Board from considering Tecmed's tender) succeeded and those orders were set aside. Order (d) (costs against the Board on an unopposed basis) remained unaltered. Order (e) (Tecmed to pay costs of opposition) was set aside and replaced with an order that each party pay its own costs (subject to order (d)). Each party was ordered to pay its own costs of appeal.
A statutory body such as a tender board derives its powers solely from its enabling legislation and has no powers beyond those conferred expressly or by necessary implication. Where a statutory body is empowered to exercise a discretion (such as to allow late tenders where delay was not the fault of the tenderer), it must be properly informed of the material facts necessary to enable it to exercise that discretion. Failure to apply its mind to whether to exercise a discretion that is a prerequisite for the validity of its decision renders that decision reviewable and liable to be set aside. Where an administrative decision is set aside on review, courts should not deny the decision-maker the authority to exercise discretionary powers conferred upon it by its enabling legislation - the matter should be remitted for proper consideration unless there are compelling reasons otherwise.
Smalberger JA assumed without deciding that the wide wording of section 4(1)(b) of the Provincial Tender Board Act might permit departure from the Regulations in certain circumstances. The Court noted that it was inconceivable that a responsible Board would have consciously chosen to depart from prescribed regulations governing tenders. On the issue of prejudice as a requirement for review, Smalberger JA assumed without deciding that it was required (based on Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare), but found that prejudice or potential prejudice to Philips was clearly present. Olivier JA in dissent noted that although Philips was not entitled to the relief in para (c) excluding Tecmed, this was of less importance and had become academic as completely new tenders would have to be invited.
This case is significant in South African administrative law for establishing important principles regarding judicial review of tender board decisions. It clarifies that tender boards, as statutory bodies, derive their powers solely from enabling legislation and must comply with both substantive and procedural requirements. Any failure to comply renders decisions reviewable regardless of good faith or motive. The case establishes that where a statutory body is granted discretionary powers (such as to consider late tenders), it must be properly informed of material facts before it can validly exercise that discretion. Failure to apply its mind to the exercise of discretion constitutes a reviewable error. The case also clarifies the limits of judicial review - courts should not usurp administrative discretions or deny statutory bodies the authority to exercise powers conferred by their enabling legislation. It demonstrates that even where an administrative decision is set aside, the matter should ordinarily be remitted to the decision-maker to exercise its powers properly, rather than the court making substantive decisions on matters within the administrator's statutory competence.