The Democratic Alliance (DA) brought an application challenging the constitutional validity of s 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. This provision states that adult citizens automatically lose their South African citizenship when they voluntarily and formally acquire citizenship of another country, unless they first obtain ministerial permission to retain their citizenship. The DA relied on the evidence of Mr Phillip James Plaatjes, a South African who became a naturalised British citizen in 2007. In 2015, when attempting to renew his South African passport at the South African embassy in London, he was informed he had automatically lost his South African citizenship and his passport was cancelled. Mr Plaatjes had never intended to renounce his South African citizenship and was unaware of the automatic loss provision. Between 2007 and 2014, he had travelled multiple times using his South African passport without any queries from immigration officials. The DA argued that s 6(1)(a) affects many South Africans living abroad who acquired second citizenship in good faith but lost their South African citizenship without notice. The high court (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) dismissed the application with no order as to costs, finding that the section was not irrational and did not violate constitutional rights. The DA successfully obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
1. The appeal is upheld with costs including the costs of two counsel. 2. The order of the High Court is set aside and replaced with the following: (a) It is declared that s 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 is inconsistent with the Constitution and is invalid from its promulgation on 6 October 1995. (b) It is further declared that those citizens who lost their citizenship by operation of s 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 are deemed not to have lost their citizenship. (c) The respondents are ordered to pay the applicant's costs including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 is irrational and unconstitutional because it provides for automatic loss of citizenship without serving any legitimate government purpose. (2) The irrationality of an automatic deprivation of citizenship is not cured by conferring on the Minister an unconstrained discretionary power to permit retention of citizenship, particularly where that discretion is exercised without guidelines or specified criteria. (3) Loss of citizenship is a form of deprivation of citizenship within the meaning of s 20 of the Constitution. The constitutional prohibition on deprivation of citizenship applies to both active deprivation and automatic loss by operation of law. (4) While s 3(3) of the Constitution mandates national legislation providing for acquisition, loss and restoration of citizenship, such legislation must comply with the Bill of Rights, including s 20. Section 3(3) does not authorise legislation that limits rights in the Bill of Rights unless justified under s 36. (5) Legislation that automatically deprives citizens of their citizenship upon acquiring foreign citizenship, without notice and without regard to individual circumstances, is arbitrary and violates the rule of law. (6) The automatic loss of citizenship under s 6(1)(a) unjustifiably limits the rights protected in ss 19 (political rights), 20 (citizenship), 21 (freedom of movement and residence) and 22 (freedom of trade, occupation and profession) of the Constitution. (7) Under the doctrine of objective constitutional invalidity, legislation that was unconstitutional when the Constitution came into effect is invalid from that date (or from the date of the Interim Constitution if it was in force then), unless the court orders otherwise under its s 172(1)(b) remedial powers.
The court made several important non-binding observations: (1) It noted with approval the Constitutional Court's statement in Chisuse that citizenship is "the gateway through which a number of rights in the Constitution can be accessed" and that deprivation of citizenship "goes to the core of a person's identity, their sense of belonging in a community and, where xenophobia is a lived reality, to their security of person." (2) The court emphasised the particular importance of protecting citizenship in South Africa given the country's "abhorrent history of citizenship deprivation suffered by many in South Africa over the last hundred and more years" under colonial and apartheid laws. (3) The court observed that citizenship is not merely a legal status but affects private and family life, choices about where to live and work, and the ability to participate fully in the political sphere. (4) The judgment notes that the Department of Home Affairs typically only becomes aware that citizens have acquired foreign citizenship when they attempt to renew their South African passports, highlighting the practical ineffectiveness of the scheme. (5) The court commented that even if affected citizens could be said to have intended to renounish citizenship, there is no reason why the Department itself should be ignorant as to who is a citizen. (6) The judgment emphasised that statutes should not be interpreted to render provisions redundant, noting that s 6(1)(a) cannot serve the purpose of renunciation because that would make s 7 superfluous. (7) The court referenced academic commentary supporting its analysis. (8) In discussing remedy, the court reiterated the principle from Fose v Minister of Safety and Security that courts must "forge new tools" and "shape innovative remedies" to ensure rights are effectively vindicated, particularly important in a country where few have means to enforce rights through courts.
This case is a landmark judgment in South African citizenship law with several significant implications: (1) It affirms that citizenship is a fundamental right that cannot be arbitrarily removed by automatic operation of law without rational justification. (2) It reinforces that rationality review requires the State to identify a specific and legitimate purpose for legislation, not merely assert a general regulatory function. (3) It establishes that conferring unbounded discretionary power on a Minister does not cure an otherwise irrational deprivation of rights. (4) It clarifies that 'loss' of citizenship is a form of 'deprivation' within the meaning of s 20 of the Constitution, and that legislation providing for loss of citizenship under s 3(3) must comply with all provisions of the Bill of Rights. (5) It recognises the historical importance of protecting citizenship rights given South Africa's apartheid history of citizenship deprivation. (6) It demonstrates the court's willingness to grant comprehensive retrospective remedies, restoring citizenship to all affected persons since 1995 without requiring further litigation. (7) It affirms South Africa's acceptance of dual citizenship as legitimate and unobjectionable. (8) The judgment has practical implications for potentially thousands of South Africans living abroad who acquired foreign citizenship and were unaware they had lost their South African citizenship. The decision vindicates the rule of law principle that deprivation of fundamental rights requires rational justification and proper notice.
Explore 7 related cases • Click to navigate