The applicant, a Yugoslavian citizen with indefinite residence in Zimbabwe, was provisionally registered as a medical practitioner and specialist obstetrician and gynecologist on 7 August 2001 with a practicing certificate restricting her practice to a government central hospital. She worked at Parirenyatwa Hospital and took unpaid leave from July 2002 to February 2003. In April 2005, she applied for re-registration on the provisional register, which was approved in May 2005 subject to obtaining a post of senior registrar under supervision. She was re-registered on the provisional register on 23 February 2006 for three years. In January 2008, the applicant applied for an unrestricted practicing certificate, which was not approved. The applicant then filed this application seeking a declaratory order that she was entitled to an unrestricted practicing certificate and consequential relief requiring the respondents to issue such a certificate.
The point in limine was upheld and the application was dismissed with costs.
Where a statute provides for domestic remedies through an appeal procedure that is capable of providing effective redress to an aggrieved person, that person must exhaust those domestic remedies before approaching the court, unless good reasons are shown for not doing so. A court will not grant a declaratory order and substitute its own decision for that of an administrative body on matters requiring technical or specialized expertise, particularly where disputes of fact exist that can best be resolved through the administrative structure provided for in the relevant legislation. The availability of a declaratory order as a form of relief does not eliminate the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies where such remedies are effective and appropriate.
The court noted that the McGown v Health Professions Council case could be distinguished from the present matter because it was decided under repealed legislation (the Medical, Dental and Allied Professions Act [Cap 244]) which did not contain provisions equivalent to sections 22(1) and 128(1) of the current Health Professions Act, and therefore did not provide for appeal procedures in cases where conditions were imposed by the Practice Control Committee. The court also observed that issues such as whether registration on the specialist register is the same as registration on the permanent register, and what effect the applicant's period of absence without leave had on her registration status, were matters requiring expertise that could best be dealt with by the domestic remedies provided for in the Act.
This case reinforces the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies in Zimbabwean administrative law, particularly in the context of professional regulation. It clarifies that even when seeking declaratory relief, applicants must exhaust statutory appeal mechanisms where these are capable of providing effective redress and no special circumstances justify bypassing them. The judgment demonstrates judicial restraint in matters requiring specialized expertise and emphasizes that courts will not readily substitute their decisions for those of administrative bodies with statutory decision-making powers in technical or professional regulatory matters.