In 2012, Mobil Oil Zimbabwe went into voluntary liquidation and handed over all its fuel depots to Total Zimbabwe except the Concession Service Station. The appellant was employed by an agent who ran the service station as a distributor for Mobil Oil Zimbabwe. After the liquidation, the appellant continued to run the service station on his own account. He forged a document (Exhibit 1) misrepresenting that he had been awarded the Concession Service Station as an exit package from Mobil Oil Zimbabwe. Using this forged document, he applied for and obtained a trading license from Mazowe Rural District Council, falsely claiming ownership of the service station. The matter came to light in 2012 when the Ministry of Lands directed the Rural District Council to issue leases to sitting tenants. The appellant resisted this directive and barred others from using the service station. Geoffrey Madanha, the alleged author of the document, disowned it during trial. Ms Mazhandu, the Human Resources Manager at Mobil Oil Zimbabwe, confirmed the appellant was never employed by Mobil Oil Zimbabwe and that Madanha, though employed, was at a junior level and not in a position to issue such a letter. She also confirmed that Mobil Oil never gave golden handshakes in the form of assets like service stations.
The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The conviction for fraud and sentence of a fine of US$400 or in default three months imprisonment was upheld.
For a conviction of fraud under section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, the prosecution must prove: (a) a misrepresentation; (b) which causes actual prejudice or is potentially prejudicial; (c) made intentionally; and (d) with the realization of the possibility that another person may act on the misrepresentation. An appellate court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial court where those findings are consistent with the evidence led at trial. A defence to a criminal charge must generally be one which is known in law, or alternatively must demonstrate that an essential element constituting the offence was not proved. Where an accused is found to be dishonest and changes the basis of their defence when challenged, the court is entitled to reject that defence as false.
The court observed that the grounds of appeal did not comply with the requirements of clarity and specificity as required by rule 22(1) of the Supreme Court (Magistrates Court) (Criminal Appeals) Rules, 1979. Nevertheless, the court allowed counsel to argue the appeal as if that requirement had been met, noting that the further they listened to counsel's submissions, the clearer it became that their initial view about non-compliance was correct. The court expressed being "taken aback" by the suggestion that the magistrate's court had erred in dismissing the appellant's defence, given the clear evidence of dishonesty and forgery.
This case reinforces the principles applicable to fraud convictions under section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] in Zimbabwe. It demonstrates the court's approach to evaluating fabricated defences and forged documents in fraud cases. The judgment clarifies that an appellate court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial court where those findings are consistent with the evidence led at trial. It also emphasizes that defences raised must be known in law or must show that an essential element of the offence was not proved, and that courts will reject defences where the accused is found to be dishonest and changes their defence when challenged. The case provides guidance on the evidentiary requirements for proving all elements of fraud, particularly misrepresentation and prejudice to public administration.