The respondent was employed by the applicant as its Finance Manager until July 2009 when he was charged with misconduct. Following a disciplinary hearing, he was found guilty and dismissed. He appealed unsuccessfully to the applicant's Area Managing Director, then appealed to the Labour Court arguing his dismissal was racially motivated and the penalty was unduly harsh. After the dismissal, the applicant demanded return of its assets in the respondent's possession, including an Isuzu truck (AAG 0764) which had been provided as part of his conditions of service. When the respondent refused to return the vehicle, the applicant brought this application to the High Court seeking an order compelling delivery of the vehicle. The appeal to the Labour Court was pending at the time of the hearing.
The application was dismissed.
Where a dispute arises from an employment relationship and is provided for in the Labour Act both in terms of cause of action and remedy, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction even if the dispute could also be resolved at common law. The possession of an employer's property by an employee under a contract of employment is so interdependently linked to the employment contract that one cannot be decided without the other. Where the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over termination of employment, it also has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to property held by the employee under the employment contract. An employer cannot defeat the Labour Court's jurisdiction by framing an employment-related dispute as a common law vindicatory claim. While section 92E of the Labour Act provides that an appeal does not suspend the decision appealed against, this does not extinguish an employee's claim of right to employer property pending determination of an appeal challenging the dismissal.
The court observed that there appears to be a general misconception amongst employers that they can easily avoid the jurisdiction of the Labour Court by seeking to recover property from employees without first exhaustively dealing with the termination of employment. The court noted it would make a mockery of the Legislature's clear intention to create a special court if its jurisdiction could be defeated by merely framing disputes as common law causes of action where the Act has made specific provisions. The court also observed that even if it had jurisdiction, at common law the respondent had successfully discharged the onus of proving a right to possess the motor vehicle against the applicant pending determination of the Labour Court appeal, distinguishing the case from situations where the employment relationship had definitively terminated.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean labour law for establishing clear principles regarding the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the limitations on employers attempting to circumvent this jurisdiction by framing labour disputes as common law claims. The judgment clarifies that: (1) employers cannot avoid Labour Court jurisdiction by characterizing employment-related disputes as common law vindicatory claims; (2) possession of employer property under an employment contract is intrinsically linked to the employment relationship and cannot be separated from it; (3) the effect of section 92E of the Labour Act (appeals not suspending decisions) does not defeat an employee's claim of right to property pending appeal; and (4) applications to recover property are premature where the underlying employment relationship remains in dispute before the Labour Court. The case reinforces the policy of conferring special jurisdiction on the Labour Court to comprehensively resolve employment disputes.