The applicants were employees of the respondent and had a labour dispute concerning unpaid salaries, cash in lieu of leave days and commission totaling USD$44,000.00. After conciliation failed, a certificate of no settlement was issued on 11 April 2019. The Labour Officer determined the matter in terms of section 93 of the Labour Court Act and made a draft ruling on 26 July 2019 in favour of the applicants, ordering payment of USD$44,000.00. The respondent raised points in limine before the Labour Court, including that the award in US dollars violated S.I. 33/19 and S.I. 142/19, and that the Labour Officer lacked jurisdiction. The Labour Court dismissed these objections, with applicants conceding they would accept payment in RTGS dollars at the interbank rate. On 24 July 2020, the Labour Court (MAXWELL J) confirmed the draft ruling in judgment No. LC/MT/50/20, ordering payment of USD$44,000.00. The applicants then sought registration of this Labour Court judgment in the High Court in terms of section 92B (3) and (4) of the Labour Act.
1. The judgment of the Labour Court under cover of case No. LC/HW/RA/173/19 being judgment No. LC/MT/50/20 was registered in terms of section 92B (3) and (4) of the Labour Act as a judgment of the High Court. 2. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicants the sum of USD$44,000.00. 3. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application.
When determining an application for registration of a Labour Court judgment under section 92B (3) and (4) of the Labour Act, the High Court must satisfy itself that: (a) the judgment was granted by a competent court/arbitrator; (b) the judgment sounds in money; (c) the judgment is still extant and has not been set aside on review or appeal; (d) the litigants are the parties to the judgment; and (e) there is proper certification. The High Court cannot decline registration on the basis that it considers the Labour Court judgment to be wrong on the merits or in violation of law, as it has no jurisdiction to review or adjudicate the correctness of the judgment. As long as the Labour Court judgment remains extant and has not been set aside on appeal or review, there is no basis upon which the High Court may decline its registration.
The court observed that the respondent's point about two conflicting Labour Court judgments (LC/MT/107/19 and LC/MT/50/20) was without substance and did not merit comment, as the applicants were only seeking to register judgment No. LC/MT/50/20. The court also noted with approval that respondent's counsel had abandoned certain 'flimsy points in limine' that had been raised in the opposing affidavit when the matter was argued before court.
This case clarifies the limited scope of the High Court's inquiry when considering applications for registration of Labour Court judgments under section 92B of the Labour Act. It establishes that while registration is not merely clerical, the court cannot inquire into the merits of the Labour Court judgment or decline registration on grounds that the judgment is allegedly wrong in law. The case reinforces the principle that challenges to the correctness of a Labour Court judgment must be brought through the proper appellate or review mechanisms, and cannot be raised collaterally through opposition to a registration application. The judgment also confirms that the requirements for registration of Labour Court judgments are similar to those applicable to arbitral awards.