The applicants appeared before the second respondent, a Regional Magistrate for the Eastern Division, on 14 August 2014 charged with fraud as defined in s 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. They were alleged to have defrauded the complainant of US$140,000.00. During trial, the applicants applied for discharge at the close of the State case, which application was dismissed by the magistrate on 18 November 2014. The applicants then launched a review application seeking reversal of the magistrate's determination on grounds of irrationality and gross unreasonableness. Critically, the applicants failed to attach a copy of the impugned ruling to their review application.
The application for review was dismissed with costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) A trial court's decision refusing discharge at the close of the State case under s 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act is not subject to review by an accused person before completion of the trial, as only the Attorney-General/Prosecutor-General has statutory appeal rights under s 198(4); (2) Superior courts will not prematurely interfere with unterminated criminal proceedings unless absolutely necessary to avert serious miscarriage of justice; (3) Review proceedings are based entirely on the record of proceedings, and it is legally incompetent for a reviewing court to upset a ruling or judgment that does not form part of the record; (4) A ruling is deemed reasonable until proven otherwise, and the applicant bears the onus of proving gross unreasonableness on a balance of probabilities; (5) Where statute vests discretion in a lower court, higher courts must not substitute their own discretion under guise of appeal or review, as this usurps the function of the lower court.
The court observed that the law maker's intention in denying accused persons the right to appeal at the discharge stage is based on sound policy: a decision against the State terminates proceedings whereas a decision in the State's favour does not terminate the trial. Upon dismissal of a discharge application, the accused has "a second bite at the cherry" to ventilate his defence in the defence case. The court also noted that allowing such reviews would create unnecessary work in the event of acquittal at trial or double work if either party appeals at completion of trial. The judge emphasized that premature interference wastes judicial resources and fragments the trial process.
This case reinforces important principles in Zimbabwean criminal procedure regarding: (1) the High Court's reluctance to interfere with unterminated criminal proceedings; (2) the asymmetrical appeal/review rights under s 198(4) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act - only the prosecution can appeal a discharge decision, not the accused; (3) the rationale for this asymmetry - to prevent premature interference where the accused still has opportunity to present a defense; (4) the fundamental requirement in review proceedings that the impugned decision must form part of the record; and (5) respect for the trial court's wide discretion in deciding discharge applications. The case demonstrates judicial policy against fragmentation of criminal trials through interlocutory reviews.