The applicant and first respondent are married but in the midst of divorce proceedings (HC 5353/21). First respondent left the matrimonial home at 12 Beach Road, Borrowdale, Harare around December 2020. The applicant claimed the house was not part of the matrimonial estate as she obtained it in a previous divorce settlement. In September 2021, first respondent applied for a protection order in the Domestic Violence Court, seeking access to the house, but the application was dismissed. On 15 November 2021, first respondent obtained an ex parte spoliation order from the magistrates' court directing applicant to give him access within 24 hours. On 16 November 2021, applicant was served with the order and noted an appeal the same day. On 17 November 2021, applicant served the notice of appeal on the messenger of court at 0913 hours and on first respondent's legal practitioners at 1100 hours. Later that afternoon on 17 November 2021, first respondent, allegedly accompanied by a locksmith, forcibly entered the premises and took occupation. Applicant and her tenants fled. Applicant then brought this urgent application for a spoliation order to restore her exclusive occupation.
On 24 November 2021, a spoliation order was granted in favour of the applicant with amendments to the draft order. Paragraphs 1-4, 9 and 10 of the draft order were granted with amendments (restoring applicant's exclusive occupation). Paragraphs 5-8 of the draft order (relating to urgent set down of the appeal) were not granted. Costs were awarded on an ordinary scale against first respondent.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The two requirements for a spoliation order under Chisveto v Minister of Local Government & Town Planning 1984 (1) ZLR 248 are that applicant must establish peaceful and undisturbed possession and that respondent unlawfully took possession without consent. (2) Under s 40(3) of the Magistrates Court Act, service of a notice of appeal suspends the right to execute a magistrates' court order unless leave to execute pending appeal is obtained. (3) Execution of a court order after service of a notice of appeal, without obtaining such leave, constitutes unlawful spoliation. (4) What is not disputed in pleadings is taken as admitted, and where a party fails to dispute specific factual allegations (such as the time of day an event occurred), there is no dispute of fact requiring resolution. (5) A certifying legal practitioner cannot be faulted for not considering documents that were not before them when preparing a certificate of urgency.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) Rule 60(8) of the High Court Rules allowing viva voce evidence is not meant to supplement shortcomings in a litigant's pleadings. (2) The court distinguished the Zimbabwe Development Party v Minister of Justice case on urgent set down of appeals, noting that urgent set down is only appropriate where failure to hear urgently would defeat the applicant's remedy entirely due to an impending event. (3) The court noted that sufficient administrative processes are available under Rule 95(20) for urgent hearing of appeals without requiring a court order. (4) The court observed that costs on an attorney-client scale require motivation and will not be granted without such motivation. (5) The court referenced the principle from Bozimo Trade & Development Company that a litigant who misleads the court is penalized by costs rather than being non-suited by reason of falsehood.
This case clarifies important principles regarding spoliation orders in Zimbabwe, particularly in the domestic/matrimonial context. It establishes that execution of a court order after service of a notice of appeal, without obtaining leave to execute pending appeal, constitutes unlawful spoliation. The case reinforces the requirements under s 40(3) of the Magistrates Court Act that an appeal suspends the right to execute unless leave is obtained. It also provides guidance on the validity of certificates of urgency and the requirements for urgent set down of appeals, distinguishing between cases where failure to hear urgently would defeat a remedy entirely versus cases where normal appellate procedures remain available.