The parties were former spouses who were granted a divorce order by consent on 19 November 2014. The consent paper, which formed part of the divorce order, dealt with the distribution of matrimonial property including the matrimonial home (Stand Number 903, Marlborough, Harare). The consent paper provided three options: (1) the house would be sold immediately for a minimum of $150,000, with proceeds split equally; (2) if no purchaser was found "immediately", either party could buy the other out within one year at the agreed price; (3) if neither party bought out the other within the year, the house would be auctioned. Five months after the divorce order, the applicant found a buyer willing to pay $180,000 (exceeding the minimum price by $30,000). When notified, the first respondent wrote to the estate agent stating the property was no longer for sale as he wished to exercise his option to buy out the applicant. The applicant brought an urgent application to compel the respondent to sign the sale documents.
The provisional order was granted with costs. The court ordered that pending the return date, the respondent was directed to retract in writing to the purchaser and/or estate agent his communication dated 14 April 2015 stating that the property was no longer for sale. Paragraph 2 of the interim relief (which was identical to the final relief) was struck off. The matter was left open for the final hearing where the respondent could present concrete proof of mortgage approval if obtained.
The binding principles established are: (1) The word "immediately" in consent papers must be interpreted contextually to mean "within a reasonable time in the circumstances of each case" rather than given a strict, literal interpretation requiring instantaneous action; (2) In determining what constitutes a "reasonable time" for property sales, courts must consider the prevailing economic environment and market conditions; (3) When a consent paper provides sequential options for dealing with matrimonial property (sale, then buy-out, then auction), a party cannot claim to exercise a later option (buy-out) when the conditions for the first option (immediate sale) have been satisfied by finding a purchaser within a reasonable time; (4) A property can only be characterized as "not for sale" when concrete steps (such as mortgage approval) have been taken, not merely on the basis of an application with uncertain outcome; (5) While procedural irregularities (such as overlap between interim and final relief) should be avoided, courts have discretion to rectify such defects where matters have merit.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The case serves as "a salutary reminder to practitioners to avoid vagueness in the drafting of consent papers - after all they are paid to solve rather than create their client's problems"; (2) Regarding certificates of urgency, the court noted that legal practitioners drink "from the same fountain" as applicants regarding facts, but their role is to "apply analytical skills to those facts with the primary aim of distilling the urgency and the core message"; (3) The court observed that "a bird in hand is worth two in the bush" in the context of having found an actual purchaser versus a speculative mortgage application; (4) The court noted that there is no hard and fast rule as to how reasons in certificates of urgency should be crafted, as what matters is whether they reveal urgency; (5) The court commented that interim relief should truly be provisional when sought and not final, though this can be rectified in meritorious cases.
This case is significant for its interpretation of consent papers in matrimonial property disputes, particularly regarding the meaning of temporal terms like "immediately" in the context of property sales. It demonstrates that courts will interpret such terms contextually, taking into account economic realities and market conditions. The case also serves as an important reminder to legal practitioners to draft consent papers with precision to avoid ambiguity. On procedural matters, it confirms the principles regarding urgent applications and certificates of urgency, while showing judicial flexibility to rectify procedural irregularities where matters have merit. The judgment reinforces that parties must take proactive steps to exercise options under consent orders and cannot rely on mere applications or intentions without concrete proof of ability to perform.