Abdulman Eric Harid, a senior civil servant, died on 20 July 2022. A dispute arose within his family concerning two purported wills: one executed on 14 July 1988 and another executed on 3 December 2009. The first defendant was the deceased's niece and was named as executrix and beneficiary in the 2009 will. The plaintiffs were the deceased's children, with the first plaintiff being the principal litigant. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the 2009 will on two grounds: (1) that it was a forgery and did not comply with legal formalities; and (2) alternatively, that the first defendant had unduly influenced the deceased to execute the 2009 will. The plaintiffs alleged an incestuous relationship between the deceased and the first defendant, claiming she had borne his children. The 2009 will benefitted the first defendant and gave her control of the deceased's farm. The deceased had approached Scanlen and Holderness law firm in 2009 to amend his 1988 will, meeting with Mrs Chieza, an estate administrator, who drafted the amended will. The will was tendered to the Master's Office by the deceased himself.
1. The plaintiffs' claim was dismissed. 2. The first plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of suit at the ordinary scale.
To prove forgery of a will, conclusive evidence is required that the signature on the testamentary document is not that of the testator; expert evidence pointing to mere inconsistencies in signatures is insufficient where standard samples also show variation and where factors such as the testator's age, health, and the passage of time are not adequately considered. To establish undue influence in testamentary matters, it must be proven that the influence caused the execution of a document that does not truly express the testator's mind; the following factors must be considered: presence or absence of independent advice, unexplained unnatural changes to the will, secrecy and haste, and the testator's susceptibility to influence. Where a testator is of sound mind, approaches legal advisors independently, explains reasons for changes to a will, and is not isolated from other family members, undue influence cannot be established on the basis of speculation about relationships or mere benefit to a particular beneficiary.
The court observed that the first plaintiff appeared to be mistakenly of the view that because the deceased was his father, he should of necessity benefit more than the first defendant from the deceased's estate. The court noted that while the claim was ill-taken, it was not necessarily brought in bad faith and had served to clarify issues for the deceased's family, which justified costs on the ordinary rather than higher scale. The court also commented on the passage of time between 2009 and 2024 (the date of testimony) and how this affected witnesses' recollection of events, noting that some uncertainty in testimony after such a lengthy period does not necessarily indicate lack of credibility. The court observed that it is not unusual or improper for a niece and uncle to be close or for a niece to be given responsibilities to run a farm.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean succession law (which shares principles with South African law) as it clarifies the evidentiary burden required to prove forgery and undue influence in testamentary disputes. It demonstrates that expert evidence on signature inconsistencies alone is insufficient to prove forgery, particularly where standard samples themselves show variation and factors such as the testator's age and health are not considered. The case emphasizes that undue influence requires proof that the will does not express the testator's true mind, and that mere benefit to a non-family member or close relationships are insufficient to establish undue influence where the testator acted independently and was of sound mind. It also illustrates the court's approach to assessing witness credibility in succession disputes and the principle that testators have testamentary freedom to benefit whomever they choose, regardless of family expectations.