On 17 September 2008, the appellant, Siyabonga Jantjies, and his girlfriend (the deceased) were at her residence when he received a phone call from an ex-girlfriend. This upset the deceased and a heated argument ensued. The deceased grabbed a large knife and tried to stab the appellant. After wrestling for the knife, the appellant disarmed her and threw the knife onto the bedside before leaving the room. The deceased allegedly threatened to kill herself. The appellant returned approximately half an hour later, found the lights off, and slept next to the deceased who was under a blanket. In the morning, he discovered she was injured and bleeding and would not wake up. The appellant informed his cousin and father, and they went to the police station to report that the deceased would not wake up. Police accompanied them to the deceased's residence where she was found dead on the bed in a pool of blood. The post-mortem examination revealed six stab wounds - three to the chest (one penetrating the heart, which was the cause of death), two to the neck, and one to the back. The appellant was charged with murder (dolus eventualis), convicted by the Regional Court Middelburg (Eastern Cape), and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
The appeal against conviction for murder (dolus eventualis) was dismissed.
In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the court must apply the test from R v Blom: (1) the inference drawn must be consistent with all proved facts, and (2) the proved facts must exclude every other reasonable inference save the one sought to be drawn. Circumstantial evidence is not inherently weaker than direct evidence. When evaluating circumstantial evidence, the court must not consider each circumstance in isolation but must take the evidence as a whole to determine whether it is beyond reasonable doubt inconsistent with innocence. Expert medical evidence regarding the probability or improbability of self-inflicted injuries is admissible and can be given significant weight in determining whether an accused committed murder. The refusal to discharge an accused at the close of the State's case under s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 involves the exercise of judicial discretion and is not subject to appeal, and the constitutional right to a fair trial under s 35(3) of the Constitution has not removed this discretion. The trial court has advantages in seeing and hearing witnesses and being steeped in the atmosphere of the trial, which advantages an appellate court does not have, and this must not be overlooked when considering appeals against findings of fact and credibility.
The court made general observations about the nature of circumstantial evidence, noting that it is folly to think that circumstantial evidence means some sort of weaker or less reliable evidence, and citing examples of scientific evidence such as DNA and fingerprint evidence which are all circumstantial yet highly reliable. The court also observed that the reasonable response to be expected from the appellant upon discovering the deceased injured would have been to seek medical help immediately, and that while waiting for such help he could then have called the elders and the police, especially since on his own version the deceased had threatened to kill herself the previous night. The court noted the peculiar feature that not only did the appellant fail to seek medical assistance, but his father and cousin also never thought to go to where the deceased was before reporting to the police, even though they were not as shocked as the appellant. These observations about expected reasonable conduct, while supporting the inference of guilt, also serve as obiter commentary on how ordinary persons would be expected to act in such circumstances.
This case is significant for its application of the principles governing circumstantial evidence in criminal cases in South African law. It reinforces the continuing application of the R v Blom test for drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence, requiring that the inference drawn must be consistent with all proved facts and must exclude every other reasonable inference. The judgment emphasizes that circumstantial evidence is not inherently weaker or less reliable than direct evidence, and that scientific and expert evidence is typically circumstantial in nature. The case also confirms that the refusal to grant a discharge under s 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act involves the exercise of judicial discretion and is not readily subject to appeal, and that this principle survives the constitutional right to a fair trial under s 35(3) of the Constitution. The judgment illustrates how courts assess the credibility of witnesses, particularly where there are material contradictions between an accused and witnesses called to support his version, and how suspicious conduct following an alleged incident can support an inference of guilt. It also demonstrates the weight accorded to expert medical evidence in determining what is probable or improbable in relation to self-inflicted injuries.