Constable Ncube J 079022S and Constable Guzha 069541M v The Police Service Commission and The Commissioner General of Police

Two police constables who were still serving their probationary period were charged under the Police Act and convicted of theft, receiving a sentence of ten days imprisonment. Following their conviction, the Commissioner General of Police discharged them from the police force during their probationary period. The applicants sought review of their discharge, alleging that the respondents acted irregularly by dismissing them without first convening a board of suitability as required under the Police Act.

• Whether the Commissioner General acted irregularly in discharging probationary police officers without convening a board of suitability
• Whether section 50(4) of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] permits the Commissioner General to summarily discharge members who have not completed their probationary period
• Whether new grounds of review could be introduced in heads of argument that were not pleaded in the founding affidavit

The application for review was dismissed with costs.

Section 50(4) of the Police Act empowers the Commissioner General of Police to discharge members who have not completed their probationary period if of the opinion that they are unfit to remain in the police force, and this power may be exercised without convening a board of suitability. The legislature deliberately gave the Commissioner unfettered powers regarding probationary members because probation is a testing period to ascertain fitness for employment. An application for review stands or falls by the contents of the founding affidavit, and new grounds of review cannot be introduced for the first time in heads of argument if not pleaded with a factual basis in the founding affidavit.

The court observed that junior police officers should conform to the rules and expectations of their employer, and that police officers seem to believe that powers to administer the police force are vested in the High Court when they are actually vested entirely in the Commissioner General and the Police Service Commission. The court noted that it appeared police officers were routinely bringing review applications that bordered on abuse of court process, and that the High Court will only intervene on substantive grounds of gross irregularities or unreasonableness of a decision, not on every decision made by the Commissioner General. The court defined probation using dictionary definitions as "the subjection of an individual to a period of testing and trial to ascertain fitness" and "testing of a candidate before admission to full employee of a firm," emphasizing the temporary and trial nature of probationary employment.

This case clarifies the extensive powers of the Commissioner General of Police under section 50(4) of the Police Act to summarily discharge probationary members without following the normal disciplinary procedures applicable to confirmed members. It reinforces the principle that probationary employment is a trial period during which the employer has broader discretion to terminate the employment relationship. The judgment also emphasizes important procedural principles in review applications, particularly that new grounds of review cannot be introduced in heads of argument if not pleaded in the founding affidavit, and that applications stand or fall on the contents of the founding affidavit. The case also delineates the limited role of the High Court in reviewing administrative decisions of constitutional bodies like the Police Service Commission and Commissioner General, emphasizing that judicial review is not supervision of day-to-day administrative decisions.