Constable Chirere T.N. 057119 K v The Trial Officer (Superintendent Gudo) and The Commissioner General of Police

The applicant, a constable in the Zimbabwe Republic Police, appeared before Superintendent Ndebele Mhambi facing a disciplinary charge of contravening paragraph 34(1) of the Schedule to the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] (omitting or neglecting to perform any duty or performing any duty in any improper manner), alternatively contravening paragraph 11 (disobeying or refusing to carry out a lawful order). During the trial proceedings, the applicant exercised his right to plead and except together in terms of section 180(4) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Both the applicant's legal representative and the prosecutor made detailed written submissions on the exception. The presiding officer ruled that he was persuaded by the public prosecutor's submissions, dismissed the exception, and directed that the charge should stand and trial continue. The applicant then sought to review the trial proceedings on two grounds: (1) that the trial officer failed to give a ruling on the exception and allowed the trial prosecutor to do so on his behalf, and (2) that the trial officer (a superintendent) had no jurisdiction to charge and try the applicant.

• Whether the trial officer failed to make a ruling on the exception raised by the applicant
• Whether a superintendent in the Zimbabwe Republic Police has jurisdiction to try a constable under section 34 of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10]
• Whether the trial proceedings were grossly irregular warranting review

The application for review was dismissed with costs against the applicant.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) A ruling made by a tribunal remains a valid ruling even when it is adverse to one party - the fact that a presiding officer prefers one party's submissions over another's constitutes a ruling, not an absence of a ruling. (2) Under section 34 of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10], an officer of or above the rank of superintendent has proper jurisdiction to try a member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police who is not an officer (such as a constable) for contraventions of the Act. A constable, being a "member" but not an "officer" within the meaning of the Act, falls squarely within the jurisdiction of a superintendent's disciplinary tribunal.

The court observed that if an applicant requires written reasons for an interlocutory ruling, the proper procedure is to request such reasons rather than to assert that no ruling was made. This comment suggests the availability of a procedural mechanism for obtaining detailed reasons, though it was not strictly necessary for the court's decision in this case.

This case clarifies important principles regarding police disciplinary proceedings in Zimbabwe. It establishes that (1) a ruling does not cease to be a ruling merely because it is unfavorable to a party; (2) if detailed written reasons for an interlocutory ruling are required, they must be specifically requested; and (3) the jurisdictional provisions of section 34 of the Police Act [Chapter 11:10] permit a superintendent to try constables and other non-officer members of the police force. The case reinforces the proper interpretation of police disciplinary tribunal jurisdiction and the standards for challenging disciplinary proceedings on review.