On 15 October 2018, the magistrate's court in Harare dismissed the applicant's special plea of prescription against the respondent's claim for eviction and ordered that two other preliminary points (locus standi and lien) be referred to trial. On 8 November 2018, the applicant sought leave to appeal by way of chamber application, which was opposed. The applicant subsequently withdrew the application for leave to appeal, believing it to be erroneous. By then, he was out of time to note an appeal. The applicant then filed an application for condonation of late noting of appeal, claiming a five-week delay was not inordinate and was caused by a procedural mistake of his legal practitioners. The matter originated from a 2016 case (HC 8727/2012) which had determined the respondent's rights to the property and provided the basis for eviction if rent ordered by the court was not paid.
The application for condonation of late noting of appeal was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay costs of suit on a legal practitioner and client scale (higher scale costs).
An application for condonation of late noting of appeal against an interlocutory order cannot succeed without leave to appeal having been granted. Where a special plea does not dispose of a matter on the merits but merely refers it to trial, the decision is interlocutory and requires leave to appeal. In assessing whether delay is inordinate, courts must consider the surrounding circumstances of each case holistically, not merely the duration of delay. A litigant must bear the consequences of procedural errors made by their chosen legal practitioners. Where an issue can still be determined at trial following an interlocutory decision, there is no prejudice to the party if condonation is refused. Courts will not lightly interfere with interlocutory decisions when the matter remains to be conclusively determined.
The court observed that higher courts are generally reluctant to intervene in interlocutory decisions since an appeal can still be filed after the conclusive judgment is rendered. The court commented that while special pleas which dispose of a matter are appealable, a special plea that does not dispose of the matter is not appealable without leave. The court noted that the application appeared to be "an exercise aimed at delaying the resolution of the matter" and constituted "frivolous and vexatious litigation intended to vex the respondent." The court remarked that "it was absolutely unnecessary to cause respondent to be dragged to court and incur legal costs in this matter" and that such abuse of court process should be visited with an order for higher costs. The court also observed that the principle that "the law does not help the sluggard" has been stated by courts "from time immemorial."
This case reinforces important principles in Zimbabwean civil procedure regarding condonation applications and appeals. It clarifies that: (1) appeals against interlocutory orders require leave to appeal; (2) inordinate delay is assessed contextually, not merely by duration; (3) litigants bear responsibility for their legal practitioners' procedural errors; (4) courts will not interfere with interlocutory decisions when the matter can still be determined at trial; (5) frivolous and vexatious litigation intended to delay proceedings will be met with punitive cost orders on a higher scale. The judgment demonstrates the court's intolerance for abuse of court process and strategic delay tactics in litigation.