Competition Commission v Coca-Cola Beverages Africa (Pty) Ltd and Food and Allied Workers Union

Coca-Cola Beverages Africa (CCBA) was formed through a merger of four authorized Coca-Cola bottlers in South Africa, approved by the Competition Commission in 2017 subject to employment-related conditions. The merger conditions prohibited retrenchment of bargaining unit employees "as a result of the merger" and required CCBA to maintain employee numbers for at least three years. In January 2019, approximately 17 months after the second transaction, CCBA retrenched 368 bargaining unit employees, citing economic difficulties including declining sales, competitive pressures, the sugar tax, and increased costs. FAWU complained to the Commission about the breach. After investigation, the Commission issued a Notice of Apparent Breach in October 2019, finding the retrenchments were merger-specific as they occurred in Sales, Manufacturing and Logistics areas where duplications had been anticipated, and involved removal of duplicate positions and harmonization of wages. CCBA applied to the Competition Tribunal for review under Competition Commission Rule 39(2)(b), seeking to set aside the Notice and declare substantial compliance. The Tribunal upheld the application, finding CCBA had substantially complied. The Commission appealed.

• What is the nature and standard of review envisaged in section 27(1)(c) of the Competition Act read with Competition Commission Rule 39(2)(b)?
• Does the Competition Tribunal have a 'separate and context specific form of review' akin to an appeal?
• What is the correct test to determine whether retrenchments are 'merger specific' as opposed to retrenchments for 'operational reasons' under labour law?
• What is the evidentiary burden on a party seeking review under CC Rule 39(2)(b)?
• Did the Commission act reasonably in issuing the Notice of Apparent Breach?
• What nexus or connection must be demonstrated between retrenchments and a merger to establish 'merger specificity'?

1. The appeal is upheld. 2. The finding that CCBA had complied with the merger conditions is set aside. 3. CCBA is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, including costs of two counsel and Senior Counsel.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 27(1)(c) of the Competition Act read with CC Rule 39(2)(b) confers ordinary review powers on the Competition Tribunal, requiring review on grounds of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness—not a special appeal-like review power. (2) Under CC Rule 39(1), the Commission need only establish an "apparent breach" (something less than conclusive proof) to issue a Notice of Apparent Breach. (3) Under CC Rule 39(2)(b), the evidentiary burden rests on the merging party seeking review to demonstrate that it has substantially complied with merger conditions—not on the Commission to prove non-compliance. (4) The test for "merger specificity" is objective: whether there is some nexus between the retrenchments and the incentives of the new controller, demonstrated as a matter of probability—not a subjective inquiry into the principal reasons or motivations of the employer, and not a causation or "but for" test. (5) Where a merger involves overlapping activities or multiple entities creating duplications, the nexus to merger specificity is more easily established because of the inherent incentive to reduce duplicate positions. (6) Merger conditions prohibiting retrenchments "as a result of the merger" operate in perpetuity and are not time-limited unless expressly stated, distinguishing them from conditions to maintain employee numbers for a specified period.

The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) That the distinction between "merger specific" retrenchments and retrenchments for "operational reasons" is often complicated and blurred, requiring careful analysis. (2) That the further removed in time from the merger a retrenchment occurs, the less likely it is to be merger-related—though this is not determinative, particularly where new controlling shareholders assume control post-merger. (3) That only a party to a merger will have full facts to justify its decisions and demonstrate substantial compliance with merger conditions. (4) That adopting either a "causal connection" or "principal reasons/motivation" test would significantly erode the employment safeguards afforded by section 12A(3) of the Act. (5) That competition authorities should observe careful distinctions between employment issues within the scope of the Competition Act versus those properly within the domain of labour law, while giving equal effect to the objectives of both regimes. (6) That the case implicates the balance between labour rights (section 23 of the Constitution) and freedom of trade (section 22). (7) That the incomparable statutory public interest safeguards in section 12A(3) through merger conditions monitored by the Commission are an important feature of South African competition law.

This case is significant for South African competition law and administrative law jurisprudence as it: (1) Clarifies that the Competition Tribunal's review power under section 27(1)(c) of the Competition Act is an ordinary review (not a special appeal-like review), requiring decisions to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. (2) Establishes the proper allocation of evidentiary burdens under CC Rule 39: the Commission must show an "apparent breach" while the merging party bears the burden of proving substantial compliance. (3) Affirms and applies the objective test for "merger specificity" from BB Investment: retrenchments are merger-specific if there is "some nexus associated with the incentives of the new controller" demonstrated on a balance of probabilities. (4) Demonstrates the sensitive interplay between competition law and labour law, particularly regarding employment protections in section 12A(3) merger conditions versus operational retrenchments under the LRA. (5) Reinforces the importance of public interest considerations (particularly employment protection under section 12A(3)) in merger control and the effectiveness of merger conditions as safeguards. (6) Has significant practical implications for future merger compliance investigations and enforcement of employment-related merger conditions.