The first applicant was a director and Chairman of the second applicant company, in which the first respondent was also a co-director. In November 2014, the first applicant suspended the first respondent and barred him from the workplace. A battle for control of the company ensued. The first respondent obtained a spoliation order in the Magistrates Court (MC 30523/14). The applicants filed an application for review of that order (HC 46/15) and sought an urgent interim stay of the spoliation order. A previous judge found that matter was not urgent and declined to hear it as such, also noting that the second applicant needed to be joined. The applicants then filed a fresh urgent application seeking: (1) to bar the first respondent from the workplace; (2) to suspend the Magistrates Court ruling pending review; and (3) to interdict the first respondent from causing breach of peace at the premises. There was a dispute about whether the first matter was withdrawn or dismissed.
The matter was removed from the roll of urgent matters with no order as to costs.
Where a court has ruled that a matter is not urgent, a party cannot file the same matter under a certificate of urgency unless it can establish new grounds upon which the matter can be said to be urgent. A matter is urgent when it cannot wait, and the availability of other legal remedies to address the alleged harm indicates that the matter is not urgent.
The court observed that there was divergence of views between the parties regarding whether the previous urgent application (HC 46/15) was withdrawn or dismissed, but the court did not make a definitive finding on this issue as it was not material to the determination. The court noted that there were several other remedies available to the applicants under the law to address the aggression and perceived disruption of normal business activities of the company.
This case reinforces the principle in Zimbabwean law that urgency in applications must be genuine and cannot be manufactured by repeatedly filing the same matter after it has been ruled not urgent. It emphasizes judicial gatekeeping of the urgent application process and prevents abuse of the urgent procedures by requiring parties to establish new grounds for urgency if they seek to re-file after an adverse ruling on urgency. The case also affirms that the availability of alternative remedies militates against a finding of urgency.