The first and second respondents were employed by the applicant company as Managing Director and General Manager respectively. They were both dismissed for misconduct on 7 April 2004. The respondents challenged their dismissal through the Labour Court, which dismissed their application. They appealed to the Supreme Court, but their appeals were irregular, filed out of time, and ultimately struck off. Applications for condonation and extension of time were dismissed by Justice Cheda on 22 July 2012. During their employment, both respondents had been issued company motor vehicles under a Managerial Staff Motor Vehicle Policy. After the final dismissal of their appeals, the applicant demanded return of the vehicles on 29 September 2011. Both respondents refused to return the vehicles, with the first respondent claiming a Mercedes Benz E 240 and the second respondent claiming a Peugeot 406. The applicant then launched this rei vindicatio application to recover its vehicles.
1. The first respondent was ordered to surrender the Mercedes Benz E 240 motor vehicle (Registration Number PL 2470) to the applicant within seven days of service of the order. 2. The second respondent was ordered to surrender the Peugeot 406 motor vehicle (Registration Number PL 2491) to the applicant within seven days of service of the order. 3. The respondents were ordered to bear the costs of the application jointly and severally on the ordinary scale.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under section 15 of the High Court Act to hear rei vindicatio claims arising from common law, even when the parties were previously in an employment relationship, as the Labour Court's statutory jurisdiction under sections 89(6) and 93(7) of the Labour Act does not extend to common law property claims. (2) In a rei vindicatio action, the applicant need only prove ownership and that the respondent is in possession of the property; the onus then shifts to the respondent to establish any legal right to retain the property against the owner. (3) Under section 19 of the Prescription Act, when prescription is interrupted by legal proceedings and those proceedings are successfully prosecuted to final judgment, prescription commences to run afresh from the date the judgment becomes executable, not from the original cause of action. Where appeals are pending, the running of prescription remains interrupted until the final appellate judgment. (4) A party cannot claim a right to property under a company policy when they manifestly fail to meet the eligibility criteria specified in that policy.
The court made observations about the improper manner in which the second respondent raised the point about the motor vehicle being damaged in an accident. Justice Takuva noted that despite having knowledge of this fact a week before the hearing, counsel did not file supplementary heads of argument and provided no supporting affidavit, effectively giving evidence from the bar. This was criticized as procedurally improper. The court also commented that the respondents' argument that they were entitled to own the vehicles simply because they had possession for over three years after dismissal was putting "the cart before the horse," emphasizing that possession obtained through wrongful retention cannot create ownership rights, particularly when the conditions for legitimate acquisition under the Motor Vehicle Policy were never satisfied.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for clarifying the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the High Court's inherent common law jurisdiction. It confirms that rei vindicatio claims, being common law remedies based on ownership rights, fall within the High Court's jurisdiction even when they involve former employees and company property. The case also provides important guidance on the interruption of prescription when litigation is ongoing, establishing that prescription runs afresh from the date of final judgment rather than from the initial cause of action when appeals are pending. It reinforces the fundamental principle that in rei vindicatio actions, a defendant cannot retain property unless he establishes a legal right enforceable against the owner, and mere possession or expectation based on a policy does not create such a right when the policy's conditions are not met.