Clive Robert Field v Bridget Anne Field (nee Parham)

The parties met in 1996 and married on 31 March 2000 under the Marriage Act, Chapter 5:11. There were no children born of the marriage. Both parties agreed the marriage had irretrievably broken down. They jointly owned six immovable properties (four in Zimbabwe and two in the United Kingdom): No. 3 Windsor Gardens, No. 3 Rowland Square, No. 32 Walmer Drive, No. 358 Gibson Road (Victoria Falls), V7 property in UK, and Penza in UK. They also owned various movable properties including bank accounts, motor vehicles, and ZSE shares. The defendant alleged the plaintiff committed gross marital misconduct including physical and emotional abuse, adultery with one Avril, and dissipation of assets. The plaintiff denied these allegations and counter-alleged the defendant was alcoholic and lacked spousal support. The main dispute centered on the redistribution of matrimonial assets, with the defendant claiming she financed most property acquisitions and seeking an award of nearly all immovable properties, while the plaintiff sought equal distribution.

• Whether the plaintiff committed acts of gross marital misconduct warranting censure in the redistribution of property
• What constitutes a fair and equitable redistribution of the assets of the marriage under section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act
• Whether the plaintiff is entitled to costs on a legal practitioner and client scale
• The proper approach to dividing jointly owned matrimonial property
• The relevance of fault in redistributing matrimonial property under the 'no fault' divorce regime

A decree of divorce was granted. The defendant was awarded No. 3 Windsor Gardens, No. 3 Rowland Square, and Penza as her sole properties. The plaintiff was awarded No. 32 Walmer Drive as his sole property. No. 358 Gibson Road was to be divided 50-50, with provisions for valuation, buy-out option, or sale. V7 was divided 75% to defendant and 25% to plaintiff, with similar valuation and sale provisions. Motor vehicles in each party's possession were awarded to them. Movables in possession of each party were retained. Joint bank accounts and ZSE portfolios were divided 50-50. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant US$3,500 and GBP2,500 for unaccounted withdrawals. Specific items of sentimental value were ordered returned to each party. Each party was to bear their own costs. Transfer timelines and procedures were specified, with the Sheriff authorized to sign documents if parties failed to comply.

Under the 'no fault' divorce regime in Zimbabwe (following Ncube v Ncube and Wachtel v Wachtel), where parties agree their marriage has irretrievably broken down, the conduct of parties plays no role in the determination of distribution of matrimonial property. Where immovable property is registered in joint names, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is held in equal shares (Lafontant v Kennedy, Kanoyangwa v Kanoyangwa). To transfer one spouse's share to the other, there must be solid grounds, such as disproportionate contributions to the acquisition, improvements, or income from the property (Takafuma v Takafuma). The correct approach is to categorize property into 'his', 'hers', and 'theirs', then apportion the jointly owned property using the criteria in section 7(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, and finally assess the overall result to determine if it places parties in the position they would have been in had the marriage continued. Courts must apply section 7(4) factors including income-earning capacity, financial contributions (direct and indirect), standard of living, duration of marriage, and conduct, endeavoring to place spouses in the position they would have occupied had the marriage continued, insofar as reasonable, practicable and just.

The court observed that in matrimonial disputes, it is seldom that faults are all on one side (citing Baines v Baines). The court noted that accusations parties make against each other are often not the cause of marriage breakdown but rather signs that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The court commented that it is inappropriate for a party to express intention to resile from agreed pre-trial issues in the middle of trial, and such concerns should be resolved before trial commences. The court noted that the proper purpose of pre-trial conference procedure would be defeated if parties could later challenge the joint pre-trial minute during trial. The court observed that where parties are divorcing, they typically blame each other for the failure of the marriage, and it usually becomes one party's word against the other's word. The court indicated that joint registration of properties cannot be solely attributed to love without recognition of some return value or contribution from the other spouse.

This case provides important guidance on the distribution of matrimonial property in Zimbabwe under the Matrimonial Causes Act. It reinforces the 'no fault' principle established in Ncube v Ncube, clarifying that marital misconduct does not affect property redistribution. The judgment demonstrates the application of the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership for jointly registered properties, while recognizing that disproportionate contributions can justify unequal distribution. It illustrates how courts balance the legal presumption of equal ownership arising from joint registration against the equitable principle of rewarding actual financial contributions. The case also provides practical procedural guidance on dealing with pre-trial conference minutes and emphasizes that parties cannot resile from agreed issues mid-trial. It demonstrates the court's comprehensive consideration of all factors under section 7(4) of the Matrimonial Causes Act including contributions (direct and indirect), duration of marriage, and the objective of placing spouses in the position they would have been in had the marriage continued.