The appellant, a Nigerian national residing in Zimbabwe, was arrested by immigration officials on 6 February 2012 under s 8(1) of the Immigration Act [Cap 4:02] on suspicion of being in Zimbabwe unlawfully. He filed an urgent chamber application in the High Court seeking immediate release from detention, arguing he was in Zimbabwe lawfully on the basis of an investor permit issued on 8 May 2007. The first respondent opposed the application, showing that: (1) the investor permit had expired in 2008 and was not renewed until 14 February 2012 (after arrest); (2) a provisional restriction notice allowing him to stay had expired on 20 January 2012; and (3) the appellant had been deported from Zimbabwe in June 2005, making him a prohibited immigrant. The first respondent filed a supplementary affidavit with Immigration Deportation Records confirming the 2005 deportation. The appellant denied having been deported and challenged the admission of the supplementary affidavit. The High Court admitted the supplementary affidavit, found the arrest lawful, and dismissed the application with costs.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
An appellate court will not interfere with a trial court's exercise of discretion to admit a supplementary affidavit unless the trial court acted on a wrong principle, failed to take relevant considerations into account, or otherwise misdirected itself. Rule 4C allows courts to condone non-compliance with procedural rules including Rule 235. A person who lacks valid immigration permits or authorization to remain in Zimbabwe is lawfully subject to arrest and detention under s 8(1) of the Immigration Act where immigration officers have reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. A person who has been deported from Zimbabwe and subsequently re-enters, or who remains in Zimbabwe without valid permits in contravention of the Immigration Act, is a prohibited person under s 14(i) of the Immigration Act. Photocopies of official immigration records certified by immigration officers are admissible as prima facie evidence under s 12(2) of the Civil Evidence Act and s 40 of the Immigration Act.
The Court observed that the effect of excluding the supplementary affidavit would have been to maintain the first respondent's earlier (incorrect) position that the appellant had been deported twice rather than once, which would have been more prejudicial to the appellant rather than less. The Court noted that the appellant had the opportunity to request leave to file his own supplementary affidavit in response but chose not to do so, which weakened his position in challenging the admission of the first respondent's supplementary affidavit. The Court also commented critically on the quality of the grounds of appeal, noting they were "repetitive in some instances and vague in others" and "have not been set forth clearly and concisely and generally are inelegantly worded," though the Court proceeded to identify and address the substantive issues despite these deficiencies.
This case clarifies several important principles in Zimbabwean immigration and procedural law: (1) Courts have discretion to admit supplementary affidavits even without strict compliance with Rule 235, particularly where justice requires all relevant facts to be before the court; (2) Rule 4C allows courts to condone departures from procedural rules; (3) The threshold for appellate interference with discretionary decisions is high - requiring demonstration of misdirection or wrong principle; (4) Immigration officers may lawfully arrest and detain persons under s 8(1) of the Immigration Act where there are reasonable grounds to suspect unlawful presence; (5) Photocopies of official immigration records are admissible as prima facie evidence under the Civil Evidence Act and Immigration Act; (6) A person who has been deported and re-enters Zimbabwe, or who remains without valid permits, is a prohibited person under s 14(i) of the Immigration Act. The case demonstrates the courts' deference to immigration enforcement where statutory requirements are not met and the procedural flexibility available to courts in the interests of justice.