Clayton Kasosera v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

The plaintiff imported a Toyota Fortuner 2016 model motor vehicle from South Africa through Beitbridge border post in April 2019. On 15 September 2020, the motor vehicle was seized by ZIMRA (the defendant) for alleged non-payment of customs duty. The plaintiff contended that the customs duty was paid in full and sought the release of the motor vehicle. Summons were issued on 14 April 2021 and served on the defendant on 15 April 2021. The defendant filed appearance to defend on 20 April 2021 and raised special pleas including that the plaintiff's claim had prescribed in terms of section 193(12) of the Customs and Excise Act Chapter 23:02, failure to comply with section 196(1) of the Act, and failure to comply with Rule 12 of the High Court Rules, 1971.

• Whether the plaintiff's claim for recovery of seized goods had prescribed under section 193(12) of the Customs and Excise Act Chapter 23:02
• Whether there was an ambiguity between section 193(12) and section 196(2) of the Customs and Excise Act regarding prescription periods
• Whether the three-month limitation period in section 193(12) applies to proceedings for recovery of seized articles
• The proper interpretation of the word 'may' in section 193(12) of the Act

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed with costs.

Proceedings for recovery of articles seized under section 193(1) of the Customs and Excise Act Chapter 23:02 must be instituted within three months of notice of seizure being given, as required by section 193(12). Section 196(2), which provides for an eight-month prescription period for civil proceedings, expressly excludes proceedings under section 193(12) through the opening words "Subject to subsection (12) of section one hundred and ninety-three". These words mean "other than what is provided in subsection, apart from, with the exception of" and create a stand-alone prescription regime for recovery of seized articles. The word "may" in the phrase "after which period no such proceedings may be instituted" in section 193(12) does not create discretion to extend the three-month period but is peremptory. There is no ambiguity between sections 193(12) and 196 requiring interpretation in favour of the taxpayer.

The court noted that the defendant conceded that notice in terms of section 196(1) of the Act had been given by the plaintiff. The plaintiff conceded its failure to use the correct form of summons, which should have been Form 2. Given the finding on prescription, the court found no need to deal with the other two special pleas raised by the defendant regarding compliance with section 196(1) and Rule 12 of the High Court Rules, 1971. The court also noted that the plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Sithole, appeared to abandon the argument regarding the interpretation of the word "may" during oral submissions after advancing it in written heads, which the court considered well-informed given the unsustainability of that line of argument.

This case is significant in Zimbabwe customs and excise law as it clarifies the relationship between section 193(12) and section 196 of the Customs and Excise Act Chapter 23:02. It confirms that the three-month prescription period in section 193(12) for recovery of seized goods operates independently from the eight-month period in section 196(2), which applies to other civil proceedings. The judgment reinforces strict compliance with prescription periods for challenging customs seizures and demonstrates that courts will not interpret the word 'may' in section 193(12) as creating discretion to extend the statutory time limit. The case provides important guidance on statutory interpretation in customs matters and emphasizes the peremptory nature of the three-month limitation period for recovery of seized articles.