Church of God of Prophecy (International) v Church of God of Prophecy and Others

The Church of God of Prophecy was founded by Kenneth Nyamhuka, who allegedly appointed the second to eighth respondents as trustees. Kenneth died in April 2014. After his death, his son Joshua (ninth respondent) and two sisters sought to take control of the church and its assets from the trustees. This led to litigation under HC 4399/14, where trustees sought spoliatory relief. The High Court dismissed the application in July 2015, but the Supreme Court upheld the appeal on 21 September 2017 and remitted the matter back to the High Court, directing that it proceed as an action. The trustees filed their declaration on 23 November 2017, and Joshua filed his plea on 25 January 2018. After pre-trial conference minutes were filed in 2019, the applicant (Church of God of Prophecy International, based in the USA) filed an application on 19 June 2019 seeking to be joined to the proceedings. The applicant claimed the local church was its affiliate, that it had provided financial support to Kenneth, that it owned the church's property, and that it had appointed Joshua as field officer after Kenneth's death.

• Whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for joinder under Rule 87(2)(b) of the High Court Rules, 1971
• Whether the applicant had a direct and substantial interest in the proceedings
• Whether the applicant's rights would be affected by the judgment
• Whether the applicant's joinder was necessary to ensure all matters in dispute could be effectually and completely determined
• Whether the joinder application would prejudice the respondents
• Whether the applicant's delay in bringing the application was fatal to its case

The application for joinder was dismissed with costs.

For a joinder application under Rule 87(2)(b) to succeed, the applicant must prove on a balance of probabilities that: (1) it has a direct and substantial interest in the issues actually raised in the proceedings (not tangential or unrelated issues); (2) its rights will be affected by the judgment; (3) its presence is necessary to ensure all matters in dispute can be effectually and completely determined; and (4) the joinder will not cause undue prejudice to existing parties. Unexplained delay in seeking joinder, absence of documentary proof of claimed interests, and evidence suggesting the applicant is merely acting to support one party rather than protecting its own independent interests will result in dismissal of the joinder application. The court will examine whether the applicant's stated grounds for joinder correspond to the actual issues pleaded in the main action.

The court observed that the applicant appeared to be "doing the bidding for Joshua" and "fighting in Joshua's corner," suggesting that Joshua, realizing the trustees had a strong case against him, enlisted support from persons in the applicant who knew his father. The court noted this was evident from both parties choosing the same legal team. The court also commented that assistance or supplementary money only augments what recipients are doing for themselves and cannot convert property acquired by the church into property owned by the donor of assistance. The judge remarked that the applicant's statement about not prejudicing the trustees "was made by it just as a matter of course" without genuine consideration of the actual prejudice that would result.

This case provides important guidance on the application of Rule 87(2)(b) of the High Court Rules, 1971 concerning joinder of parties in Zimbabwean civil procedure. It reinforces the two-tier test from Marais v Pongola Sugar Milling Co that a party seeking joinder must demonstrate: (1) a direct and substantial interest in the issues raised in the proceedings, and (2) that their rights may be affected by the judgment. The case emphasizes that courts will scrutinize the true purpose behind joinder applications and will consider factors such as unexplained delay, lack of supporting evidence, and whether the joinder relates to the actual issues in dispute. It also demonstrates that courts will not permit joinder where the applicant appears to be merely supporting one party's position rather than having an independent interest requiring protection. The judgment illustrates the importance of matching the grounds for joinder with the actual issues pleaded in the main action.