The 13 applicants were councillors for the City of Harare. The 1st respondent was the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, and the 2nd respondent was a councillor, deputy mayor and acting mayor of Harare. On 31 May 2004, the Minister issued a directive through his permanent secretary ordering that all internal council elections be deferred. The applicants had previously filed an urgent chamber application on 24 May 2004 seeking to interdict the respondents from interfering with council operations. Omerjee J ruled that matter was not urgent and should proceed as an ordinary application. Despite this, on 31 May 2004, the applicants held a full council meeting and voted to proceed with elections in defiance of the ministerial directive. The 2nd respondent, as acting mayor, declared the meeting closed, but the applicants reconstituted themselves and proceeded with elections. The Minister then suspended all 13 applicants from council with effect from 1 June 2004 in terms of section 114(1) of the Urban Councils Act for misconduct in defying his directive. The applicants then filed another urgent application seeking to set aside the suspension and interdict further interference.
The urgent application was dismissed. The court ordered that the matter should proceed as an ordinary application. The applicants were ordered to bear the costs of the application.
A litigant who deliberately defies a lawful directive with full knowledge of the consequences and thereby creates their own predicament through self-help cannot establish urgency warranting preferential treatment in court proceedings. Urgency must be demonstrated by exceptional circumstances beyond the litigant's control, not self-created emergencies. Where a litigant has already approached the court to challenge the validity of a directive, they must await the court's determination rather than exercising self-help by interpreting and implementing the law in their own favour, as this usurps the judicial function and is incompatible with the rule of law. The duty and authority to interpret the lawfulness and validity of governmental directives lies with the courts, not with the affected parties.
The court made several important obiter observations: (1) That those who bring urgent proceedings gain considerable advantage over other litigants, and preferential treatment should only be extended where good cause is shown; (2) That absent special circumstances, courts must hear cases on a first-come, first-served basis, as every case is important to the litigants concerned; (3) That courts and the public frown upon exercise of self-help as it is inimical to the rule of law; (4) That in a civilised parliamentary democracy such as Zimbabwe, citizens must refrain from taking the law into their own hands and must have recourse to lawful dispute resolution mechanisms including courts, mediation, conciliation and arbitration; (5) That those who clamour for the rule of law must themselves operate within the confines of the rule of law; (6) That while the wheels of justice turn slowly, law-abiding citizens must have the discipline and patience to wait for justice in terms of the law and cannot exercise self-help only to rush to court when tables turn against them.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative and local government law for several reasons: (1) It reinforces the principle that urgency in applications must be genuine and not self-created through deliberate defiance of legal directives; (2) It emphasizes the prohibition against self-help and the importance of using lawful dispute resolution mechanisms; (3) It clarifies that councillors cannot unilaterally defy ministerial directives issued under the Urban Councils Act while challenging their validity in court - they must await judicial determination; (4) It demonstrates the court's gatekeeping function in preventing abuse of urgent application procedures by litigants who create their own emergencies through unlawful conduct; (5) It upholds the separation of powers by condemning attempts by litigants to usurp judicial functions by interpreting and implementing laws in their own favour. The case serves as an important precedent on the proper approach to urgent applications and the rule of law in local government contexts.