Christopher Harly Brace Macquire and Twairob Investments (Pvt) Limited v Munyaradzi Tichaona and Bernard Mahara Mutanga

The first applicant, the second respondent, and the first applicant's brother all claimed shareholding and directorship in the second applicant (Twairob Investments). The first applicant and his brother had been tried, convicted and sentenced for fraudulently making themselves directors. The second applicant owned the remainder of Gurlyn Barton A (Makomo Farm), approximately 30 hectares. The first applicant and his family occupied a house on stand number 19 of the farm, measuring 30,615 square metres, peacefully from 2009. On 23 July 2013, a day after a Supreme Court ruling against the first applicant in another matter, the first respondent (acting as projects manager of the second applicant) drove to the house and left household furniture (beds, stoves, deep freeze, fridge, lounge suits) in the verandah. The first respondent claimed to have been utilizing the property with the first applicant's consent for ten months prior, dumping bricks and selling water from boreholes on other stands far from the house, which the first applicant did not object to.

• Whether the first applicant had locus standi to depose to an affidavit on behalf of the second applicant
• Whether the certificates of urgency and Rule 247(2)(b) signed by the applicant's legal practitioners were improperly certified
• Whether the application complied with Rule 241 of the High Court Rules
• Whether the matter was urgent
• Whether the first applicant had been despoiled of peaceful possession and occupation of stand number 19
• Whether the first respondent's prior activities on other stands constituted acquiescence by the first applicant to interference with stand number 19

The application succeeded with costs. The court ordered the parties to revert to the status quo ante and maintain peace pending finalisation of the case relating to ownership, directorship and control of the second applicant.

A possessor need not be dispossessed of the whole property to be entitled to a spoliation order; deprivation of possession of only part of the property entitles the possessor to spoliation relief. To succeed in a spoliation application, an applicant must show on a balance of probabilities that: (1) they were in peaceful occupation and possession of the property; and (2) the possession or occupation was unlawfully interrupted or seriously disturbed by the respondent. Self-help actions that disturb peaceful possession are unlawful and will be sanctioned by the courts, which require parties to assert rights through due process rather than taking the law into their own hands. Previous acquiescence to activities on distant portions of property does not constitute consent to interference with the specific portion in peaceful occupation.

The court observed that urgent matters by their nature require expeditious handling, and certificates of urgency prepared by legal practitioners from the same firm do not reduce the court's discretion in determining urgency; such certificates may be preferable to those from unconnected practitioners who may sign blindly without proper familiarity with the case. The court noted that self-help actions are a recipe for serious disaster and cause disorder in society, leading to disruption of law and order and increased workload for law enforcement agents and courts. The court commented that the real protagonists in the case were the first applicant and first respondent, with the second applicant and second respondent being remotely connected, though the court still found the second respondent was involved through the actions of the first respondent as agent.

This case demonstrates the Zimbabwean High Court's approach to spoliation remedies, emphasizing protection of peaceful possession regardless of underlying ownership disputes. It illustrates the court's willingness to apply procedural flexibility (Rule 4c) to avoid dismissing meritorious cases on technicalities. The judgment reinforces the principle that self-help remedies are impermissible and that parties must pursue rights through proper legal processes. It also clarifies that partial dispossession (affecting only part of property) is sufficient for spoliation relief, applying the principle from Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property.