The plaintiff had been leasing Dagbreek Farm from the State since 6 February 2004. Between 2006 and 2009, the first defendant (Makoni Rural District Council) authorized the second defendant (International Organisation for Migration) to use Dagbreek Farm as a distribution center for food to needy villagers in the area. The plaintiff was neither informed nor consulted about this decision. During the food distribution period, between 200 to 400 people would converge on the farm monthly to receive food. The plaintiff's property suffered extensive vandalism and theft, including the loss of 35 head of cattle in one day, vandalization of ZESA equipment leading to failed crops due to inability to irrigate, and other damages. The plaintiff sought intervention from various authorities including the local Councillor and Government Ministers without success. She only discovered that the first defendant had authorized the use of her farm on 14 December 2011 when she received a letter from the first defendant in response to her demand for compensation. The plaintiff issued summons on 16 April 2012 claiming US$100,000 for loss of property and vandalism and US$150,000 for unlawful interference with farming activities and loss of crops. The second defendant conceded indemnification and the plaintiff did not pursue any order against it.
The first defendant was ordered to pay: (a) US$100,000.00 damages for loss of property and vandalism; (b) US$150,000.00 damages for unlawful interference with Dagbreek farming activities and loss of crops; (c) Interest at the prescribed rate on the above amounts from the date of judgment to date of final payment; (d) Costs of suit on the ordinary scale.
A local authority that designates private land as a public distribution center without the knowledge or consent of the landholder creates a duty of care toward that landholder. Where it is reasonably foreseeable that such designation will result in large numbers of people entering the property and thereby create risk of vandalism and theft, the local authority must act with a high degree of care to protect the landholder's property from harm. Failure to take any steps to adequately protect the property constitutes negligence, even if the authority purports to rely on servitude rights or emergency powers under the Civil Protection Act. The requirements of section 23 of the Civil Protection Act, including notification of the occupier and provision for compensation, apply to such situations. If the conduct of a person who owes a duty of care falls even in the slightest degree below the standard of a reasonably prudent person, they are guilty of negligence.
The court noted that the plaintiff's actual losses exceeded what she claimed but observed that she could only be awarded what was claimed in the summons. The court also commented that the first defendant should not have authorized use of the plaintiff's farm when there were other public areas suitable for the purpose, such as Folkington Primary School which had been used as a polling station previously. The court observed that the designation of the farm as a distribution center led people to believe the farm had been repossessed by the State and was 'no man's land,' contributing to ongoing theft and vandalism. Regarding prescription, the court noted that until 14 December 2011, the plaintiff did not know who the real defendant was, and when she found out, she issued summons within the limitation period. Additionally, if the delict was a continuing delict from 2006 to 2009, the plaintiff was still within the three-year period when she issued summons in 2012.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean law for establishing that local authorities owe a duty of care to landholders when they designate private land for public purposes without consultation or consent. It reinforces the procedural requirements under section 23 of the Civil Protection Act regarding notification of land occupiers and compensation. The case demonstrates that public entities cannot rely on statutory powers (such as servitude rights or emergency powers) to absolve themselves of liability when their actions create foreseeable risks to private property and they fail to take reasonable steps to mitigate those risks. It also illustrates the application of delictual principles regarding negligence and foreseeability in the context of administrative decisions affecting private property rights.