The applicants obtained an interim order from Zhou J on 28 December 2020 (HC 7529/20) barring respondents from carrying out mining activities and ferrying quarry stones from Jilikin Mine Registration Number 12641BM. The respondents appealed against this order (SC 584/20), which suspended its operation. In response, the applicants obtained leave to execute pending appeal from Chitapi J on 2 February 2021 (HC 27/21). Despite these court orders, from 18 May 2021, the first respondent allegedly resumed ferrying quarry stones from Jilikin Mine. The applicants' security guards, Engo Wuta and Thomson Maseko, witnessed trucks entering the mine and loading quarry stones. When the security guards attempted to intervene, they were threatened with death and subsequently arrested. The applicants then brought this urgent application seeking to have the first respondent held in contempt of court.
1. The 1st respondent was found to be in wilful contempt of Court Orders HC 7529/20 and HC 27/21. 2. The 1st respondent was ordered to pay a fine of RTGS$2,500,000 within 10 working days of service. 3. The 1st respondent was ordered to pay the applicants' costs on a legal practitioner and client scale. 4. The application against the 2nd respondent was dismissed with costs.
To establish contempt of court, an applicant must prove three elements: (1) that an order was granted against the respondent; (2) that the respondent was served with the order or informed of it with no reasonable ground for disbelief; and (3) that the respondent disobeyed or neglected to comply with the order. The standard of proof for contempt proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. What is not denied in affidavits must be taken to be admitted (per Fawcett Security Operations). While corporate entities act through their directors and officers, before directors can be held personally liable for contempt with orders affecting their liberty, they must be personally cited and served in accordance with Rule 39(1) of the High Court Rules. Court orders are binding on all persons and must be obeyed as mandated by section 164(3) of the Constitution, and the rule of law is a fundamental pillar of civilized society. Contempt by commission (active defiance) is more serious than contempt by omission and warrants punitive measures.
The court made observations about the importance of the rule of law as "a pillar of every orderly and civilized society" and expressed its displeasure at conduct constituting unlawful and intentional refusal to comply with court orders. The court noted that the circumstances called for punitive costs given the aggravated nature of the contempt. The court also commented that even if the date in the security report was 1 May rather than 18 May (as alleged to be a typographical error), this would not alter the finding on urgency. While the court amended the relief at the hearing to refer to directors rather than "representatives or agents," it ultimately could not grant the relief against directors due to lack of personal service, demonstrating judicial flexibility in procedure while maintaining strict adherence to procedural requirements affecting personal liberty.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for reinforcing the fundamental importance of compliance with court orders and the rule of law in a democratic society. It demonstrates the court's willingness to impose substantial penalties for wilful contempt, particularly where the contempt involves active defiance through acts of commission rather than mere omission. The judgment emphasizes constitutional recognition of the binding nature of court orders under section 164(3) of the Constitution. It also provides guidance on the procedural requirements for holding corporate directors personally liable for contempt, clarifying that personal service is required before orders affecting their liberty can be made. The case also contributes to the jurisprudence on urgency in applications and the resolution of disputes of fact on the papers in motion proceedings.