Carnaud Metal Box (Private) Limited v Constantine Chiyanike

The respondent, Constantine Chiyanike, was an employee of the applicant company and secretary of the workers committee. On 14 October 2011, he applied for permission to attend a Labour Court hearing scheduled for 17 October 2011. Although his term of office had expired on 30 September 2011, a new committee had not been appointed and he sought to attend to unfinished matters. The applicant denied permission, but the respondent attended regardless. This led to disciplinary proceedings against him. On 27 January 2012, the Local Joint Committee of the National Employment Council sat as a disciplinary committee but reached a deadlock. The matter was referred through various levels and ultimately on 21 March 2012, the full Council ordered that the matter be referred to arbitration. On 2 August 2012, Arbitrator E. Maganyani issued an award ordering the applicant to reinstate the respondent without loss of salary and benefits, or negotiate damages. The applicant sought to set aside this arbitral award, arguing there was no agreement to arbitrate and that the award violated the law and public policy of Zimbabwe.

• Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to review an arbitral award in a labour dispute given the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction over labour matters
• Whether the arbitral award should be set aside on grounds that there was no agreement between the parties to refer the matter to arbitration
• Whether the award violated the law and public policy of Zimbabwe
• Whether Article 34 of the Arbitration Act permits the court to review the award on the grounds alleged
• Whether the Local Joint Committee had the power to refer the matter to arbitration

The application to set aside the arbitral award was dismissed with costs against the applicant.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) The High Court has jurisdiction to review arbitral awards in labour matters pursuant to section 13 of the High Court Act and section 171(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, notwithstanding the Labour Court's jurisdiction over labour disputes. (2) An arbitral award may only be set aside under Article 34 of the Arbitration Act on specified grounds, including where the award conflicts with public policy, but mere faultiness or incorrectness is insufficient. (3) Employment councils have statutory authority under section 62(1) of the Labour Act to take expedient steps, including referring disputes to arbitration, to settle disputes between employers and employees. (4) Courts should not interfere with decisions of employment councils to refer matters to arbitration unless such decisions violate the law. (5) Where parties participate in proceedings and there is evidence (including written agreement) of consent to arbitration, the arbitral award will not be set aside on grounds of lack of consent.

The court made non-binding observations endorsing the approach taken by Gowora J in Husaihwevhu & 2 Ors v UZ-UCSF Collaborative Research Programme HH 237/10, stating that the import of Articles 34 and 36 of the Arbitration Act is not to imbue the court with powers of appeal to determine the correctness of the arbitrator's decision. The court is not sitting as a court of appeal to adjudicate the correctness or erroneous nature of the arbitrator's reasoning. The court also observed, citing Zesa v Maposa 1999 (2) ZLR 452, that an award should only be set aside if the reasoning or conclusion goes beyond mere faultiness and constitutes a palpable inequity that is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or acceptable moral standards that it would intolerably hurt the conception of justice in Zimbabwe. The court found nothing to suggest such palpable inequity in the present case.

This case establishes important principles regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to review arbitral awards in labour disputes despite the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction over labour matters. It affirms the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under section 171(1)(a) of the Constitution. The case also clarifies the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards under Article 34 of the Arbitration Act, particularly the requirement of consent to arbitration. It confirms that employment councils have the power under section 62(1) of the Labour Act to refer disputes to arbitration as an expedient step to resolve disputes. The judgment emphasizes judicial restraint in interfering with arbitral awards and decisions of employment councils, holding that courts should not interfere unless such decisions violate the law.