The second applicant (Robert Daniel Benatar) and the respondent (Colleen Beatrice Benatar) were formerly married and now divorced. In June 2011, the respondent filed an application (HC5257/11) for liquidation of various companies in which the first applicant had an interest. The second applicant, as managing director of the first applicant, signed a settlement agreement on 11 June 2011 at the respondent's legal practitioners' offices. The respondent subsequently filed a chamber application to register the settlement agreement as an order of court. The applicants allege the second applicant was coerced and manipulated into signing the agreement and lacked authority to bind the first applicant. The chamber application was served twice on the applicants' legal practitioners (in June and November 2012). The applicants did not file opposing papers within the prescribed time. In July 2013, the settlement agreements were registered as court orders. The applicants then sought to set aside this order under Rule 449, claiming it was erroneously granted in their absence, was obtained by fraud, the second applicant was coerced, and the settlement was unlawful.
The application was dismissed with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.
For purposes of Rule 449(1)(a) of the High Court Rules, 'absence' means not only physical absence from court when judgment is granted, but also refers to absence in terms of the rules - that is, being deliberately and intentionally not in attendance despite service of papers in terms of the rules, or despite notice that an order is being sought in default. Rule 449 does not apply where a party or their legal practitioner was aware of the proceedings and deliberately chose not to appear or file the necessary papers within the prescribed time period. Service of a chamber application through legal practitioners is valid service under Order 5 Rule 37(2), as applications (other than summons, writs, warrants or court orders) may be served by the party or their legal practitioner. A handwritten note by a judge does not constitute a formal court order or directive unless transcribed and formally communicated. The three requisites for relief under Rule 449 must be satisfied: (a) judgment was erroneously sought and granted, (b) judgment was granted in absence of applicant, and (c) applicant's rights are affected.
The court observed that Rule 449 is an exception to the general rule of functus officio and must be resorted to only for purposes of correcting an injustice that cannot be corrected in any other way. The rule goes beyond mere formal, technical and clerical errors and may include the substance of the error or judgment. The court noted with displeasure that this application wasted the court's time and was entirely devoid of merit from the outset because the provisions of Rule 449(a) were not met. The court described the case as 'a dog's breakfast', particularly given that subsequent orders had whittled away at the applicant's cause of action in trying to recover properties lost in divorce proceedings. The court considered a punitive costs order appropriate to mark its displeasure for the callous wasting of its time.
This case provides important guidance on the interpretation of 'absence' under Rule 449 of the High Court Rules in Zimbabwean law. It establishes that absence encompasses not merely physical absence from court proceedings, but deliberate failure to participate through filing papers despite valid service and notice. The judgment clarifies the requirements for valid service of chamber applications, confirming that service through legal practitioners is valid under the rules for applications (as opposed to summons, writs, warrants or court orders which must be served by the Sheriff). The case also reinforces that Rule 449 is an exceptional remedy that cannot be invoked where a party deliberately chose not to participate despite having notice and opportunity to do so. The decision emphasizes that fraud must be established with proper evidence, not mere allegations, when seeking rescission on common law grounds.