On 12 August 2005, Ngoepe JP in the Pretoria High Court authorised 21 search warrants in terms of section 29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. The warrants were sought to obtain evidence for use in corruption proceedings against Jacob Zuma and related criminal proceedings against Thint (Pty) Ltd and Thint Holdings. On 18 August 2005, approximately 250 members of the Directorate of Special Operations executed the warrants simultaneously at premises throughout South Africa, seizing approximately 93,000 documents. Five of the warrants related to: Zuma's Johannesburg flat, his Nkandla residence in KwaZulu-Natal, his former office at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, his former offices in Durban, and his attorney Michael Hulley's offices in Durban. The warrants specified they authorized searches for evidence of corruption, fraud, money laundering and tax offences. Each warrant had Annexure A listing 23 categories of documents to be seized (limited to items "which has a bearing or might have a bearing on the investigation"), and Annexure B relating to electronic data. Zuma and Hulley challenged the validity of the warrants.
Appeal upheld by majority. The order of the Durban High Court (per Hurt J) declaring the five search warrants invalid and the searches unlawful was set aside. An order was substituted dismissing the application with costs, including costs of two counsel. The dissenting judges would have dismissed the appeal and varied the High Court order to provide for copies of seized documents to be retained under seal by the Registrar pending any future prosecution.
Per Nugent JA (majority): (1) The validity of a search warrant must be determined by construction of the authorising statute, not by applying pre-conceived templates from other jurisdictions or cases. (2) A warrant must be intelligible and must not authorise more than the statute permits, but the statute does not require that a warrant contain sufficient information to enable the searched person to identify then and there what may be seized. (3) Section 29 of the NPA Act, properly construed, permits warrants that authorize seizure of material that "has a bearing or might have a bearing on the investigation" without requiring detailed disclosure of the investigation's nature in the warrant itself. (4) The scope of a warrant's authority can be determined with certainty by reference to objective facts about the investigation, even if those facts are not contained in the warrant. (5) Section 29(5)(c) requires only that material cannot be expected in the ordinary course to be produced voluntarily, not that it be shown impossible to obtain by other means.
Per Nugent JA: (1) It would be remarkable if an investigator could do without a warrant what cannot be done under judicial control of a warrant. (2) Section 29(10), which permits warrantless searches in certain circumstances, may or may not be constitutionally invalid, but that question was not before the Court. (3) How an investigation is to be conducted falls within the prerogative of the investigator; courts should not dictate which relevant material may be sought. (4) Courts should not develop a "body of practice" for warrant requirements as they have for Anton Piller orders, because warrants derive from statute, not inherent judicial powers. Per Farlam JA (dissenting): (1) The "not then and there" qualification proposed by counsel for appellants would not be correct. (2) Constitutional considerations do not necessarily supersede pre-constitutional cases on severance of invalid portions of warrants (disagreeing with Hurt J on this point). (3) In complex investigations, there may be circumstances where the "metes and bounds" requirement could be dispensed with on urgent warrantless searches if justified under s 36 of the Constitution.
This case represents a significant division in the Supreme Court of Appeal on the requirements for valid search warrants under the National Prosecuting Authority Act. The majority judgment adopts a permissive approach to warrants, holding that they need not contain detailed information about the investigation to enable the searched person to identify seizable items, provided the warrants are intelligible and do not exceed statutory authority. The minority adopts a more restrictive approach emphasizing constitutional rights to privacy and requiring warrants to be intelligible "then and there" to the searched person. The case grapples with balancing effective law enforcement against constitutional protections, particularly in complex economic crime investigations. The differing approaches reflect tensions between crime control imperatives and due process values in post-constitutional South African criminal procedure. The case is significant in the ongoing legal saga involving Jacob Zuma and provides important guidance on the execution of search warrants in high-profile corruption investigations.
Explore 1 related case • Click to navigate