Eskom had constructed an electrical substation on the appellant's farm Nooitgedacht pursuant to a 1997 notarial deed of servitude with a previous owner. Although the notarial deed granted rights to erect a substation and lead electricity over the property, these servitudes (except a right of way) were never properly registered against the title deeds through successive transfers. By the time the appellant purchased the property in 2014, the substation had existed for 17 years and had expanded beyond the originally contemplated area to approximately 1 hectare. The appellant challenged Eskom's occupation as unlawful since the servitudes had not been properly registered as real rights. An eviction application resulted in a consent order suspending eviction pending the outcome of Eskom's expropriation application. The Minister of Public Works (first respondent) approved the expropriation of servitudes for the substation, overhead power lines, and right of way on 30 September 2016. The appellant sought to review this decision on multiple grounds including improper purpose, lack of clarity, procedural unfairness, and bias.
The appeal was dismissed save for variation of the high court order. Paragraph 2 of the high court order (which purported to amend the expropriation decision to limit it to existing power lines) was set aside. Paragraph 1 was amended to clarify that the entire expropriation decision of 30 September 2016 (covering the substation, overhead power lines, and right of way) was under review. The remaining paragraphs were renumbered. The appellant was directed to pay the first and second respondents' costs of the appeal, including costs of two counsel where employed.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Expropriation may lawfully be used to regularise pre-existing unlawful occupation where the primary purpose of the expropriation is to serve a genuine public purpose or public interest as required by section 25 of the Constitution. An ancillary purpose to regularise an unlawful situation does not vitiate an otherwise lawful expropriation. (2) The test for whether expropriation serves a public purpose is whether it benefits the whole population or the local public, not merely the state or government. The provision of electricity infrastructure clearly constitutes such a public purpose. (3) Expropriation decisions are polycentric administrative decisions requiring an equilibrium between competing interests, to which courts must show deference, though they remain subject to judicial review. (4) The procedural fairness requirements under PAJA do not automatically include a right to reply to responses, a right to discovery of all internal documents, or a right to comment on summaries provided to other decision-makers, absent specific statutory provision or compelling circumstances. (5) For administrative action to be reviewable for bias, it must be shown that a reasonable, objective and informed person would reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker (not merely his officials) did not bring an impartial mind to bear. (6) Internal administrative guidelines and processes do not create enforceable procedural rights beyond those required by applicable legislation and constitutional principles. (7) When determining the adequacy of a description of property or rights to be expropriated, the decision must be read together with any diagrams or other documents expressly incorporated by reference.
The court made several non-binding observations: It noted that where a servitude expropriated might correspond with an existing registered servitude, the less burdensome servitude would lapse by merger, which might affect compensation but not the validity of the expropriation decision. The court commented that had Mr Hitge's title deed been properly endorsed initially with all servitudes created in the notarial deed, and had subsequent deeds of transfer not perpetuated that omission, the legal difficulties would not have arisen. The court observed that it would be 'irrational' to expend R120 million to relocate a functioning substation a short distance, and such funds would better serve the public interest if applied to new infrastructure or maintaining the existing electricity grid. The court noted that Eskom, as an organ of state with distinct legal personality from the state, would be required to purchase land owned by the state if it wished to relocate to the adjacent state-owned portion 5. The court observed that 'way leave agreements' referred to in evidence apparently prohibited structures within nine meters of the center line of power lines and required vegetation clearance, which would explain the 18-meter width of the power line servitudes. On the facts, the court expressed the view that Eskom had not been shown to have acted other than bona fide in relation to its occupation of Nooitgedacht.
This case is significant for establishing that expropriation may lawfully be used to regularise pre-existing unlawful occupation by an organ of state, provided the expropriation itself serves a genuine public purpose. It clarifies the interplay between sections 25 of the Constitution, the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, and the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. The judgment provides important guidance on the application of PAJA to expropriation decisions, particularly regarding procedural fairness requirements, the limits of the right to be heard, and the principle of deference to polycentric administrative decisions. It confirms that an ancillary purpose to regularise an unlawful situation does not invalidate an expropriation that otherwise serves a legitimate public purpose. The case also clarifies that internal administrative guidelines do not create enforceable procedural rights beyond what is required by statute and the Constitution. It demonstrates the courts' approach to allegations of bias in administrative decision-making and reinforces that officials' views do not necessarily reflect the decision-maker's final position.
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