The first applicant owned the farm Houtkaprus, Citrusdal, Western Cape, and the second applicant conducted farming operations on it. The first respondent (aged 48) was a former farm worker who had been working on the farm since 1982 and residing there since 2000. When the first applicant acquired the farm in 2010, the first respondent concluded both an employment contract (on 4 weeks' notice) and a housing agreement (terminable on 2 months' notice after employment ended) with the second applicant on 9 November 2010. About 5 weeks later, on 17 December 2010, the first respondent resigned voluntarily, citing difficulties with management style, personnel and human relations. His resignation was accepted and he stopped working on 13 January 2011. The first respondent referred a dispute to the CCMA alleging unfair dismissal, but the referral was 53 days late and his condonation application was refused on 1 June 2011, leaving the CCMA without jurisdiction. Notices to vacate were served on 7 March 2011 and 16 May 2011, but the respondents refused to vacate. The second respondent (first respondent's wife, aged 45) had only worked as a seasonal worker for the previous owner before the farm was acquired by the applicants, and her right of residence was dependent on the first respondent's employment. The respondents continued to occupy House no. 3 on the farm rent-free with their 2 daughters and 2 grandchildren.
1. The respondents and all persons occupying through them shall vacate House no. 3 on the farm Houtkaprus, Citrusdal, Western Cape, on 17 June 2014. 2. In the event of failure to vacate on 17 June 2014, the Sheriff is authorised to secure their eviction on 18 June 2014. 3. No order as to costs.
1. An occupier who voluntarily resigns from employment on a farm may be evicted under Section 10(1)(d)(ii) of ESTA where the resignation does not amount to constructive dismissal under the Labour Relations Act. 2. Where a dispute about termination of employment is referred to the CCMA outside the prescribed time period and condonation is refused, the CCMA lacks jurisdiction and there is no 'outstanding dispute' for purposes of Section 8(3) of ESTA that would invalidate a notice to terminate residence. 3. A notice to terminate residence served before a CCMA determination is not invalid where no dispute had been properly referred at the time of service, or where the CCMA subsequently finds it lacks jurisdiction. 4. A spouse or family member's right of residence that is dependent on an employed occupier's right of residence terminates when the employed occupier's right terminates. 5. The requirement to provide suitable alternative accommodation in Sections 10(2) and 10(3) of ESTA does not apply to occupiers who voluntarily resign under Section 10(1)(d)(ii), though it remains a factor to be addressed in the probation officer's report under Section 9(3). 6. The right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution is enforceable against the state and does not generally lie against a private landowner, absent exceptional circumstances.
The Court noted that an offer by respondents to pay R100 per month rental to remain on the premises was relevant to the probation officer's report and comparative hardships analysis. The Court observed that the applicants owned many farms, but stated this fact did not detract from the principle that housing rights are not enforceable against private landowners. The Court reiterated the established practice of the Land Claims Court not to award costs in social action litigation of this nature, save in exceptional circumstances.
This case clarifies the application of ESTA provisions regarding eviction of farm workers who voluntarily resign, particularly: (1) the standard of proof for establishing voluntary resignation versus forced resignation; (2) the validity of termination of residence notices served before CCMA determination where the dispute was not properly before the CCMA due to lack of condonation; (3) that dependent spouses' rights of residence derive from the employed spouse and terminate when the employed spouse's rights terminate; (4) that suitable alternative accommodation need not be provided under Sections 10(2) and 10(3) for occupiers who voluntarily resign under Section 10(1)(d)(ii), though it remains a factor in the probation officer's report under Section 9(3); and (5) that the right of access to housing is enforceable against the state, not private landowners, absent exceptional circumstances (following Modderklip). The case demonstrates the balance between occupiers' housing rights and landowners' property rights in the ESTA context.