The appellant, Yvonne K N Makhudu, was a senior manager of Telkom's Affirmative Action Project who held a doctorate in industrial relations. She was convicted in the Regional Court at Pretoria on five counts of fraud to which she had pleaded guilty. The fraud involved: (1) In September/October 1996, falsely claiming travel expenses of R693.00 for an official trip to Crystal Springs Mountain Lodge that she was not entitled to; and (2) In February, June and July 1996, on three occasions falsely representing that named Telkom employees were entitled to flight tickets from Johannesburg to Cape Town for official business (at R611.00 per ticket), when in fact the tickets were used by her fiancé's niece for private purposes. At the time of trial, she was conducting her own practice as a consultant in industrial relations earning approximately R20,000.00 per month. She had no previous convictions.
The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The sentence as ameliorated by the Transvaal Provincial Division was confirmed, consisting of: (1) A fine of R5,000 or 100 days' imprisonment on each of five counts (R25,000 total); (2) 100 days' imprisonment per count suspended for five years on condition that she is not convicted of fraud during the period of suspension; (3) Correctional supervision for 18 months including: community service of 16 hours per month for 18 months (cleaning and gardening services at Forest Farm, Sandton); participation in a responsibility acceptance programme and reality confrontation programme. The house arrest for 12 months and prohibition on use of alcohol or drugs that had been imposed by the magistrate were set aside by the Provincial Division and remained deleted.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) When a High Court on appeal partially amends a magistrate's sentence by deleting certain components but leaving others undisturbed, any further appeal remains one against the magistrate's judgment (as amended), not the High Court's exercise of sentencing discretion; (2) The behaviour and demeanour of an accused in court is not ordinarily a proper factor to be taken into account in aggravation of sentence. It may only be relevant if it indicates lack of repentance or intended future defiance of the law, or if it establishes that the accused is the kind of person who would best be deterred from future criminal activity by firmer treatment. Courts should not use sentencing powers to "put an accused in their place" based on courtroom conduct; (3) A court should be slow to draw conclusions about an accused's character and likely reaction to punishment based solely on demeanour and behaviour in court; (4) White collar crime involving abuse of a position of trust warrants firm sentencing even when relatively small amounts are involved, particularly where the conduct was calculated and repeated rather than a momentary lapse; (5) An accused cannot on appeal complain about conditions of sentence to which their legal representative acquiesced at trial without objection.
The Court made several obiter observations: (1) Marais JA noted that while courtesy is due by a court to all who appear before it whatever their station in life, when dealing with self-confessed offenders who have committed serious crimes of dishonesty, some sense of proportion is not out of place. This appeared directed at the appellant's "somewhat exaggerated view of her own importance and status"; (2) The Court observed that white collar crime had become notoriously prevalent and courts of high authority had lamented a tendency on the part of some courts to impose sentences which were rightly generally regarded as being too lenient; (3) The magistrate's reference to the appellant as having been on "the gravy train" and his statement that others on that "train" needed to be deterred were described as "uncalled for," though not amounting to material misdirection; (4) The Court suggested that problems may arise in determining whose sentence is under consideration on appeal in situations falling between complete substitution of sentence and complete dismissal of the appeal; (5) The Court noted it was not entirely clear whether the Provincial Division had deleted certain components of the sentence because they were inappropriate per se or to ameliorate the overall cumulative impact of an overly severe sentence.
This case is significant in South African criminal law for establishing important principles regarding: (1) Sentencing appeals where a High Court has partially amended a magistrate's sentence - clarifying that the appeal remains against the magistrate's judgment as amended; (2) The limited circumstances in which an accused's behaviour or demeanour in court may be taken into account in sentencing - emphasizing that courts should not use sentencing powers to "put an accused in their place" based on courtroom conduct; (3) The approach to sentencing white collar crime involving abuse of positions of trust, affirming that courts should deal firmly with such offences even when relatively small amounts are involved; (4) The appropriateness of combining fines with correctional supervision and community service for fraud offences; (5) The principle that complaints about sentence conditions cannot be raised on appeal where the accused's legal representative acquiesced to them at trial.