The respondent obtained a default judgment against the applicant on 1 February 2012 under case HC 9205/11. The applicant had filed appearance to defend on 3 November 2011. A notice to plead and intention to bar was served on the applicant's correspondent legal practitioners (Mtetwa & Nyambirai) on 25 November 2011, but they allegedly failed to notify the legal practitioners of record (Cheda & Partners). The applicant became aware of the default judgment on 28 February 2012 through a letter from the respondent's legal practitioners. On 11 June 2012, the applicant filed two applications simultaneously: HC 6250/12 for rescission of the default judgment and HC 6249/12 for condonation of late filing. Both applications were set down for hearing on 15 July 2013. The applicant also failed to file heads of argument for the rescission application in accordance with the rules.
Both applications (HC 6249/12 for condonation and HC 6250/12 for rescission of default judgment) were dismissed with costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.
An application for rescission of a default judgment in terms of Order 9 r 63(1) must not only be filed but also set down for hearing within one month of the applicant acquiring knowledge of the judgment. Where this time limit is not met, an application for condonation of non-compliance must be made and granted before the court can consider the merits of the rescission application. It is not competent to file and set down applications for condonation and rescission simultaneously for hearing, as condonation is a prerequisite to considering a rescission application filed out of time. An applicant seeking condonation must provide acceptable explanations for both the delay in filing the rescission application and the delay in seeking condonation itself. Litigants must bear the consequences of their legal practitioners' negligence in complying with court rules, and the court will not readily exercise its discretion to depart from rules where there has been flagrant disregard for procedural requirements.
The court observed that it is not desirable to set down applications for condonation simultaneously with applications for rescission of judgment because different considerations govern each type of relief. The court commented that laxity in dealing with non-observance of court rules encourages legal practitioners to disregard those rules to the detriment of the good administration of justice. The court noted that considerations ad misericordiam (appeals to mercy) should not become invitations to laxity, and that courts have been burdened with an undue and increasing number of condonation applications due to attorney negligence. The court observed that vague references to settlement negotiations between parties do not constitute acceptable explanations for failing to comply with procedural time limits.
This case reinforces the strict application of procedural time limits in Zimbabwean civil procedure, particularly regarding applications for rescission of default judgments. It clarifies that Order 9 r 63(1) requires not only filing but also setting down for hearing within one month of knowledge of the default judgment. The case emphasizes that condonation applications must be determined before rescission applications filed out of time can be heard, and that simultaneous filing and hearing is not competent. It demonstrates the courts' commitment to enforcing procedural rules strictly to maintain the administration of justice, and reaffirms the principle that litigants must bear the consequences of their legal practitioners' negligence. The imposition of punitive costs signals the court's intolerance of flagrant disregard for court rules and procedures.