The appellant, Brian Davies, was the former owner of Tabas Induna Farm in Umguza, which was acquired by the Government of Zimbabwe under the Land Reform Programme in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10) in 2002. The farm was subdivided and the respondent, Floyd Ambrose, was allocated Subdivision Lot 15 by offer letter dated 16 July 2010. The appellant remained in occupation of the remaining extent (Lot R). In July 2015, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to swap occupation of their respective portions, subject to Ministerial consent. The parties approached the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, who confirmed they could proceed pending approval. The parties took occupation of their new portions. In November 2018, the Ministry confirmed awareness of the swap and indicated the matter was being finalized. However, in October 2017, the respondent purported to cancel the Memorandum, claiming it was null and void, and instituted eviction proceedings in the Magistrates Court. The Magistrates Court granted judgment in favour of the respondent, ordering the appellant's eviction from Lot 15.
1. The appeal is upheld. 2. The judgment of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with: "The plaintiff's claim is dismissed with costs." 3. The respondent shall bear the costs of suit.
1. The Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement has sole and exclusive statutory authority over all gazetted land acquired under the Land Reform Programme in terms of the Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act (Chapter 20:28). 2. The failure to cite the Minister in proceedings seeking eviction from gazetted land constitutes fatal material non-joinder where the relief sought has a direct bearing on the Minister's powers or exercise of discretion. 3. The Magistrates Court lacks jurisdiction under section 11(1)(b)(iii) of the Magistrates Court Act (Chapter 7:10) to determine ejectment matters involving gazetted land governed by the Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act. 4. Section 3 of the Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act empowers only criminal courts to order eviction following conviction for unlawful occupation; it does not grant civil courts jurisdiction to order eviction. 5. A cession agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) for the swap of rights in gazetted land is not unlawful per se and is not void ab initio where it complies with formalities of cession and is made subject to Ministerial approval, pending such approval being granted or refused.
The Court observed that the Ministry of Lands officials had acknowledged the swap arrangement and indicated they would await approval from the Minister, suggesting administrative recognition of the arrangement. The Court noted that if the swap arrangement was not in compliance with any law, the Minister of Lands had the sole prerogative by virtue of statute to regulate the use or occupation of such land in an appropriate manner. The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the magistrate (Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands and Douglas Stuart Taylor-Freeme v Senior Magistrate Chinhoyi), noting those cases dealt with unlawful occupation by former owners without offer letters or land settlement leases, which was not the situation in the present case.
This case clarifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement over gazetted land under Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme, establishing that ordinary courts lack jurisdiction to make determinations affecting gazetted land without the Minister's involvement. It reinforces the principle that the Gazetted Lands (Consequential Provisions) Act creates a specialized statutory regime that excludes ordinary civil court jurisdiction. The case is significant for establishing when non-joinder of the Minister is fatal to proceedings involving gazetted land, applying the test from Tour Operators Business Association of Zimbabwe v Motor Insurance Pool. It also clarifies that cession agreements involving gazetted land are not inherently unlawful but require Ministerial approval, and that such agreements cannot be unilaterally cancelled by one party while awaiting that approval. The judgment limits the application of section 3 eviction powers to criminal proceedings only.