The applicant and respondent were divorced parents of two minor children: Ephraim Chiyangwa (born 23 March 2003) and Hossana Chiyangwa (born 26 June 2006). They had married under the Marriages Act [Chapter 5:11] and were granted a decree of divorce on 6 July 2017. The decree awarded custody to the respondent (mother), with the applicant (father) entitled to access every two weekends per month and half of school holidays. The applicant was ordered to pay $1000 monthly maintenance plus school fees and curriculum activities. The children attended Heritage School. In 2017, the applicant consulted the respondent about transferring the children to another school, citing cost and quality of education concerns. On 31 October 2017, he notified Heritage School in writing of his withdrawal of the children. The respondent rejected most proposed alternative schools. The applicant secured placement at Littlerock International School, paid $2030 in fees and $469 for uniforms. On the school opening day in January 2018, the respondent refused to allow the children to attend the new school. The applicant then brought an urgent application to compel the respondent to allow the children to attend Littlerock International School.
The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.
An urgent application will be dismissed where the applicant has deliberately or carelessly abstained from taking action when the need to act arose, thereby creating self-created urgency. Where a matter arises in October but the urgent application is only filed in January (4-5 months later) without explanation for the delay, this constitutes self-created urgency and does not comply with Rule 244 of the High Court Rules. A party cannot wait for 'doomsday to arrive' and then claim urgency. In matters involving children's welfare, the court as upper guardian will not permit disruption to children's education where a parent seeks to transfer children to a new school after they have already commenced the school term at their existing school, particularly where the application is based on self-created urgency.
Mangota J made important observations about the court's role as upper guardian of minor children, noting that children do not choose to have parents who divorce and that parental disputes tend to adversely affect children's emotional well-being. The court emphasized that it will jealously guard against infringement of children's rights and welfare, as these 'innocent souls' find themselves at the mercy of feuding parents through no choice of their own but by natural course. The judge observed that the applicant's conduct of seeking to move children to a new school two weeks after term had commenced was 'totally disruptive to the children's education' and likened it to 'closing the stable after the horses have already bolted.' These observations underscore the court's protective approach to children caught in parental disputes and its expectation that parents claiming to act in children's best interests must demonstrate this through timely and considered action.
This case demonstrates the Zimbabwean High Court's approach to urgent applications in family law matters, particularly those involving children's welfare. It reinforces that the court, as upper guardian of minor children, will scrutinize applications claiming urgency to ensure they are not based on self-created urgency arising from a party's own delay or inaction. The case emphasizes that claims of acting in children's best interests must be substantiated by conduct consistent with such claims, and that disrupting children's established schooling arrangements without proper justification will not be countenanced. It also illustrates the principle that what is not denied in affidavits is taken as admitted in motion proceedings.