Bhekani Mlilo v The State

The applicant was arrested in Botswana on 15 July 2025 and extradited to Zimbabwe in November 2025. He faced charges of contravening section 126 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. The allegations were that on 3 October 2024, the applicant, together with five named accomplices (Elijah and Abraham Vumbunu, Simon Xola Ngcobo, Menzeli Mpofu and Khalid Ntimen), drove from South Africa in a white Ford Ranger. They replaced the South African registration plates with Zimbabwean plates before proceeding to ECOBANK Parkade where they blocked a Safeguard Private Security Cash-In-Transit vehicle, held security guards hostage, and using firearms, took 2 metal cash boxes containing US$4,448,500 and 3 firearms. The applicant fled to Botswana while two accomplices were arrested in South Africa awaiting extradition. After his arrest and extradition, the applicant applied for bail pending trial.

• Whether the applicant should be admitted to bail pending trial
• Whether the applicant poses a flight risk
• Whether granting bail would be in the interests of the proper administration of justice
• How to balance the constitutional right to bail against the interests of justice

The bail application was dismissed. The applicant was refused bail pending trial.

Where an applicant for bail has previously evaded arrest and was only apprehended through extradition proceedings after fleeing across international borders, such conduct constitutes compelling evidence of flight risk that justifies refusal of bail in the interests of the proper administration of justice. The constitutional right to bail under section 50(1)(d) can be interfered with where there are compelling reasons, and demonstrated ability and willingness to evade arrest across porous borders, combined with the seriousness of the offence and the strength of the State's case, constitute such compelling reasons.

The court observed that mere passport stamps are not conclusive proof that a person crossed a border, as passports can be stamped through the use of cross-border transporters without the person actually crossing. The court also made rhetorical observations questioning whether admitting such an applicant to bail would be tantamount to saying 'now go and ensure you make it impossible for the police to track you' and whether it would be irresponsible of the court to grant bail under such circumstances. The court noted that while the applicant's alibi defence (that he was in Mozambique at the time) was yet to be investigated, this did not outweigh the other factors pointing to flight risk.

This case demonstrates the application of constitutional bail principles in Zimbabwe in cases involving serious organized crime with cross-border elements. It illustrates how courts balance the constitutional right to bail against the interests of justice, particularly where an applicant has demonstrated flight risk through previous evasion of arrest across multiple jurisdictions. The judgment reinforces that while bail should not be used as anticipatory punishment, compelling reasons exist to refuse bail where there is clear evidence of flight risk and potential impediment to the administration of justice, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence.